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TRUST PROTECTORS, AGENCY COSTS, AND
FIDUCIARY DUTY
Stewart E. Sterk*
In recent years, fiduciary duty scholarship has focused on the
agency cost problems that afflict private trusts.1 Robert Sitkoff has
demonstrated that a number of familiar fiduciary duties—including the
duty of impartiality, the duty to invest for total return, and the duty of
care—operate to align the interests of the trustee with those of the
settlor and the beneficiaries.2 Melanie Leslie, in arguing that settlor and
trustee should not enjoy unlimited freedom to vary the content of
fiduciary duties, has emphasized that information asymmetries
undermine the assumption that the trust agreement will provide optimal
control of agency costs.3 Both Sitkoff and Leslie have focused on the
difficulties inherent in relying on the market to monitor trustee
behavior, and thus control agency costs.4 And even John Langbein, in
the course of his controversial proposal to jettison the no-further-inquiry
rule, concedes that the “difficulty of beneficiary monitoring underscores
the importance of the duty of loyalty.”5
Agency cost analysis of private trusts, however, confronts an
immediate difficulty: who is the principal? Two candidates emerge: the
trust beneficiaries, who are often treated as the “equitable owners” of
the trust property, and the trust settlor, without whose property (and

* Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank Greg
Alexander, Melanie Leslie, Rob Sitkoff, Jeff Stake, and Michael Yu for insightful comments on
an earlier draft, and Christine O’Neil for invaluable research assistance.
1 “Agency costs” refer to the losses suffered by a principal because her agent’s interests—
and hence incentives to act—diverge from those of the principal. The principal can reduce those
costs by monitoring the agent’s activities or by bonding the agent. Hence, Jensen and Meckling
have defined agency costs as the sum of the principal’s monitoring expenditures, the principal’s
bonding expenditures, and the principal’s residual loss—the remaining reduction in the
principal’s welfare as a result of the divergence of the interests of the principal and the agent.
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
2 Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 65057 (2004).
3 Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94
GEO. L.J. 67 (2005).
4 Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 645-46; Leslie, supra note 3, at 82-84.
5 John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 957 (2005).
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without whose consent) there would be no trust.6 Existing trust doctrine
equivocates on who serves as the trustee’s principal: the trust settlor
may impose a variety of enforceable obligations on the trustee, but
those restrictions are enforceable only by the trust beneficiaries, not by
the trust settlor.7
Often, this equivocal answer presents few practical difficulties. On
many issues, the interests of the settlor and the interests of the
beneficiary are aligned; the settlor’s primary objective is to benefit the
beneficiaries, and if the trustee is serving the beneficiaries, the trustee is
also serving the settlor. But to conclude that a trustee who serves the
beneficiaries also serves the settlor does not address the basic agency
cost problem: how do we assure that the trustee provides the care and
loyalty the settlor and the beneficiaries expect?
Moreover, on some issues, equivocation about identifying the
trustee’s principal presents more significant difficulties. Suppose, for
instance, the settlor wishes to control trust distributions in ways that the
beneficiaries (or some subset of beneficiaries) do not like. Treating the
beneficiaries as the trustee’s principal is inconsistent with much
traditional doctrine,8 and particularly with the emerging contractarian
theory of the trust.9 But treating the settlor as the principal also creates
a significant practical and conceptual problem: the settlor will typically
be dead for much of the trust’s duration. Practically, the settlor’s
demise often makes it impossible to determine whether the trustee is
faithfully representing the wishes of the dead settlor. Even if the settlor
left explicit instructions on some matters, the settlor could not possibly
have anticipated all of the decisions a trustee would face. And that
6 Robert Sitkoff has argued that because the joint intent of contracting parties carries with it
a presumption of Pareto optimality, the settlor should generally be treated as the trustee’s
principal. Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 644-48. For another recent exploration of some of the issues,
see Alan Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose Property Is
It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649 (2005).
7 Moreover, there are subtle differences between the predominant approaches in the United
States and England. As one court has put it:
The American cases recognize primarily the privilege of the donor to qualify his gift as
he pleases within legal limits. Cujus est dare ejus est disponere. The English courts
concentrate their predominant attention upon the situation of the beneficiary who being
substantially the owner of the trust estate should be permitted in their judgment to deal
with it as he wishes.
Speth v. Speth, 74 A.2d 344, 347 (N.J. 1950). See generally Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 662-63
(discussing differences between the American approach and the English approach, which tends to
treat beneficiaries as the trustee’s principals).
8 For instance, traditional doctrine restricts the power of the trust beneficiaries to compel
modification or termination of the trust when termination would frustrate a material purpose of
the settlor. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).
9 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625 (1995); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 447-49 (1998).
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problem—the settlor’s lack of foresight—becomes more serious as the
duration of the trust increases.10 Conceptually, treating the dead settlor
as the principal raises a time-honored question in the law of trusts and
estates: for how long should current decisions be controlled by the dead
hand of a settlor who has long since met his maker?11
Suppose now that we superimpose on the traditional trust
framework a “trust protector”—a person selected by the settlor to
represent the settlor’s interests in making specified trust decisions that
the settlor will be unable to make. As the living embodiment of the
dead settlor, the protector has the potential to mitigate the foresight
problems associated with dead hand control. At the same time, the
protector has the potential to serve as a monitor of the trustee’s
performance, reducing agency costs in that respect as well.
To be sure, the office of trust protector did not develop to “solve”
the agency cost problems associated with private express trusts.
Instead, as Part I of this Article demonstrates, the trust protector
emerged in the context of offshore trusts, where trust settlors have
sought to maintain as much control over trust assets as possible while
shielding those assets from creditors. But lawyers have recognized the
potential of the office and have quickly adapted the trust protector to
serve other functions.
Appointment of a trust protector, however, provides at best a
modest amelioration of the agency cost problem, not a complete
solution. The trust protector, too, is only an agent. The settlor did not
choose to relinquish title to the protector but chose instead to give the
protector limited powers to guide trustee behavior. As a result, the
emergence of trust protectors raises a new set of agency cost problems:
first, do protectors owe any enforceable duties to the trust beneficiaries,
or to anyone else; second, how, if at all, do the powers conferred on the
trust protector affect the responsibilities of the trustee?
The emergence of the trust protector is so new that current doctrine
has not yet answered these questions. And the answers may differ
depending on the purposes for which the protector was appointed and
the powers the settlor has conferred on the protector. This Article
attempts to situate the trust protector in the web of relationships that
surround the private express trust, exploring the agency costs avoided—
and created—with the advent of trust protectors, and examining the
ramifications for fiduciary duty law.

10 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in
the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 734-35 (1986).
11 See generally LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955).
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRUST PROTECTOR
A.

Origins in the Growth of the Asset Protection Trust

Trust protectors are not indigenous to American trust law. Even
before the last two decades, some English trusts used protectors to
reassure settlors uneasy about the powers conferred on the trustee.12
But protectors were imported into the United States from offshore
jurisdictions seeking to attract asset protection business. The typical
offshore asset protection trust names as a trustee a person or institution
beyond the personal jurisdiction of American courts. The reason for
this practice is evident: if the trustee were subject to the jurisdiction of
American courts, an American court could order the trustee to make
trust assets available to American creditors, and could impose sanctions
on the trustee for failure to comply with the court order.13
Despite their strong desire to protect their assets from creditors,
American settlors of offshore trusts have often been reluctant to
relinquish all control over their assets to a foreign entity. As a result,
trust instruments have frequently named a “trust protector” with various
powers over the trust and the trustee. Sometimes, the settlor named
himself as protector,14 but the settlor who named himself as protector
increased the risk that an American court would order him to compel
the trustee to make the money available to trust creditors—defeating the
purpose of the asset protection trust.15 Many settlors, therefore, opted to
name a third party as protector.
In determining what powers to confer on the trust protector,
settlors had to weigh competing risks. By conferring broad affirmative
powers on the protector—even if the protector was not the settlorbeneficiary—the trust settlor would increase the risk that an American
court with personal jurisdiction over the protector would pierce the trust
at the behest of the settlor’s creditors. The settlor could minimize that
risk by leaving the protector only with power to veto the trustee’s

12 See Antony Duckworth, Protectors—Fish or Fowl?, 4 J. INT’L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 137,
168 (1995).
13 Cf. Hardy v. Hardy, 5 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (a court with jurisdiction over a
trustee can compel the trustee to account for or dispose of trust property located in another state).
14 See, e.g., FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1999).
15 Id. at 1242.
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decisions;16 an American court would find it difficult to order the
protector to veto a decision the trustee had never made.17
On the other hand, limiting the protector to veto powers would
reduce the protector’s value for other purposes. For instance, the settlor
might want to confer on the protector power to change the situs of the
trust to take advantage of the enactment of more trust-friendly laws, or
to escape political or legal instability in the original situs. The trustee,
who might have strong ties to the original situs, might be reluctant to
make such a change. Moreover, the settlor might want to give the
protector power to remove the trustee upon suspicion or evidence of
malfeasance. But to accomplish these objectives, the settlor would have
to accept increased risk of intervention by an American court.18 Quite
naturally, various settlors have balanced these objectives differently,
resulting in wide variety among the powers conferred on protectors of
offshore trusts.
Use of protectors in offshore trusts originated out of the creativity
of lawyers, not out of express statutory authorization. But as the use of
protectors became more prevalent, a number of offshore jurisdictions
did enact legislation authorizing use of protectors. The Cook Islands
International Trust Amendment Act of 1989 began the move toward
statutory recognition, and other offshore jurisdictions followed suit.
Although all of the statutes recognize that the protector is the holder of a
power,19 the statutes otherwise embrace significantly different
conceptions of the protector. Thus, the statute enacted in the British
Virgin Islands provides expressly that a protector “is not liable to the
beneficiaries for the bona fide exercise of the power.”20 By contrast, the
Belize statute provides that “[i]n the exercise of his office a protector
shall owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the trust or to the
purpose for which the trust is created.”21

16 See Gideon Rothschild, Establishing and Drafting Offshore Asset Protection Trusts, 23
EST. PLAN. 65, 70 (1996) (“The protector’s powers should generally be drafted as negative
powers and subject to the anti-duress provisions to protect against an order compelling the
protector to exercise control over the trust.”).
17 See Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 287, 309 (2002).
18 Cf. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1242 (trust settlors name themselves as protectors; court
relies on their occupancy of office of protector to conclude that settlors retained power to force
repatriation of trust assets).
19 See, e.g., International Trusts Act of 1984 § 7 (as amended 1989) (Cook Islands)
(“‘Protector’ in relation to an international trust means a person who is the holder of a power
which when invoked is capable of directing a trustee in matters relating to the trust . . . .”).
20 Trustee Ordinance § 86(3) (1961) (as amended by the Trustee (Amendment) Act (1993))
(British Virgin Islands).
21 Belize Trusts Act 1992 § 16(5), available at http://www.ifsc.gov.bz/acts/trustsact.pdf. See
generally MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 257-62 (Simon Dix trans., 2000).
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Despite the statutory differences, appointment of a trust protector
has become standard in offshore asset protection trusts.22 And, in more
recent years, the use of protectors has spread to domestic trusts as well.
B.
1.

Domestic Trusts

Limited Foresight and Changed Circumstances

Widespread use of protectors in offshore trusts led American
lawyers to recognize the protectors’ potential to solve problems facing
settlors of domestic trusts. One such problem involves how to adapt the
trust’s provisions to account for circumstances not foreseen by the
settlor at the time of the trust’s creation.23 As trusts become longer in
duration, the problems of change and inadequacy of foresight increase
in importance.24 Changes in law, for instance, might result in frustration
of the settlor’s purposes. Similarly, unforeseen changes in family
situation could make modification of the trust terms desirable. Judicial
modification or termination of the trust is always a possibility, but
existing doctrine places a number of obstacles in front of parties who
seek judicial modification.25 Moreover, a judicial proceeding costs
money, which will typically operate to deplete trust resources.
22 Donovan W. M. Waters, The Protector: New Wine in Old Bottles?, in TRENDS IN
CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 64 (A.J. Oakeley ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
23 See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law,
and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 664 (2002) (noting the need for
flexibility because the settlor will have passed from the scene when many unanticipated events
unfold).
24 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish The Rule Against
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003) (cataloging reasons for a
move in many states to authorize perpetual trusts).
25 Black letter law has long been that beneficiaries can compel termination or modification of
a trust if all of them consent, so long as there is no material purpose in continuing the trust. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959). For an application of the black letter law,
see, e.g., Am. Nat’l Bank of Cheyenne v. Miller, 899 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1995) (authorizing
termination). If, however, the trust is spendthrift, legislatures and courts have often concluded
that termination would frustrate a material purpose, thus precluding termination. See, e.g., CAL.
PROB. CODE § 15404(b) (West 2005); Culver v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 70 N.E.2d 163
(N.Y. 1946). Other courts have been even more restrictive, finding material purposes inconsistent
with termination simply because the trust instrument provides a life interest to an income
beneficiary. See Adams v. Link, 145 A.2d 753 (Conn. 1958).
The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts have attempted to liberalize traditional
termination rules in two ways. First, the black letter of section 65 permits termination even if a
material purpose would be frustrated, so long as a court concludes that “the reason for
termination . . . outweighs the material purpose.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2)
(2003). Second, a comment to section 65 provides that a spendthrift provision does not by itself
establish that termination would frustrate a material purpose of the trust. Instead, a spendthrift
clause furnishes only “some indication” of a material purpose inconsistent with termination. Id. §
65 cmt. e.
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The settlor could, of course, account for these problems by making
the trust revocable, but settlors have a variety of reasons for parting
more completely with any interest in the trust property.26 Moreover, if
the trust is designed to be perpetual, revocability is not an option,
because the settlor is in no position to revoke after her death.
Alternatively, the settlor could confer on one or more beneficiaries
a right to modify the trust’s terms. This alternative, however, creates
two potential problems, at least if the instrument authorizes the
beneficiary to modify in favor of herself. First, a beneficiary with
power to modify might act in self-interest, frustrating the settlor’s
wishes. Second, the power to modify might be construed as creating in
the beneficiary a general power of appointment, generating unfortunate
tax consequences.27
To avoid these problems, the settlor could give modification
powers to the trustee, but trustees are often reluctant to modify or
terminate trusts, even when termination would serve the settlor’s
interests.28 Moreover, the settlor may choose the trustee for reasons
unrelated to the trustee’s ability to account for the settlor’s imperfect
foresight.
Against this background, the trust protector offers what may be an
attractive alternative—a person whose primary function is to exercise
judgment on behalf of the trust settlor. The model may be most
attractive when the protector is a trusted confidante of the settlor, but
that model can only work for the lifetime of the confidante. Even a
professional protector, or a successor chosen by the settlor’s original
protector, may be superior to the other available alternatives for dealing
with deficiencies in the settlor’s foresight.
2.

Policing the Trustee

26 For instance, if the trust were revocable, the settlor would be treated as the owner of the
trust property for federal income tax purposes. 26 U.S.C. § 676 (2000).
27 See 26 U.S.C. § 2041 (property over which decedent enjoyed general power of
appointment included in decedent’s estate); 26 C.F.R. § 20.2041-1(b) (2006) (“[A] power given
to a decedent to affect the beneficial enjoyment of trust property or its income by altering,
amending, or revoking the trust instrument or terminating the trust is a power of appointment.”);
see also Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Trust Protector: Trust(y) Watchdog or Expensive Exotic
Pet?, 30 EST. PLAN. 390, 395 (2003).
28 Thus, trustees sometimes challenge the termination of trusts—generally unsuccessfully—in
order to preserve their right to commissions. See, e.g., Moore v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of
Macon, 130 S.E.2d 718, 721 (Ga. 1963) (finding that the incidental benefit which the trustee may
derive from future commissions is not of such a character as gives it a vested right to the
continuance of the trust); see generally 4 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 337 (4th ed. 2001).
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Although trust protectors became popular in a context where the
settlor’s main objective was to protect trust assets against settlor’s
creditors, the protector device also has potential to protect trust assets
against the actions of the settlor’s chosen trustee. When the settlor
creates a trust, she conveys to the trustee legal title to the trust property.
Inherent in the trust, however, is the settlor’s intention that the trustee
not treat the property as his own. Instead, trust law presumes that the
settlor wants the trustee to manage the trust assets prudently and in the
interest of the trust beneficiaries.29 Fiduciary duty law gives content to
that presumption, which the settlor can modify with appropriate
language in the trust instrument.30
A critical issue remains, however: how does the settlor ensure that
the trustee acts in accordance with the settlor’s expectations? Trust
law’s traditional response is to enlist the trust beneficiaries as monitors,
through the mechanism of an action for breach of fiduciary duty.31 By
subjecting the trustee to potential liability, trust law encourages the
trustee to comply with settlor’s instructions. But monitoring by the
beneficiaries is both imperfect and costly. First, the beneficiaries
themselves often lack the expertise to detect breach.32 Second, the
beneficiaries may be dependent on the trustee, and hence they may be
reluctant to take action to discipline the trustee.33 In combination, these
factors suggest potential underdeterrence of trustee misbehavior.34 In
addition, of course, the trust beneficiaries will bear much of the
litigation cost. And, as Professor Leslie has demonstrated, market
monitoring—which has some potential for disciplining fiduciaries in the
corporate context—is wholly inadequate in the trust context.35
By contrast, if the settlor appoints a trust protector, the protector
might be in a position to relieve the trust beneficiaries of the primary
29 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 76-78 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005)
(providing that the trustee has a duty to administer the trust “in accordance with the terms of the
trust and applicable law,” and then describing the duty of prudence and duty of loyalty).
30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76, cmt. on Subsection (1); b(1) (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2005) (“[T]he normal standards of trustee conduct prescribed by trust fiduciary law may, at
least to some extent, be modified by the terms of the trust. Briefly stated, much of trust law,
especially trust fiduciary law, is default law—but some is not.”); see also John H. Langbein,
Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105 (2004); Langbein, supra note 9,
at 660.
31 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959) (discussing liability in the
case of a breach of trust); see also Rock & Wachter, supra note 23, at 653-55.
32 See Leslie, supra note 3, at 84.
33 See Benjamin G. Carter, Relief for Beneficiaries Suing for Breach of Fiduciary Duty:
Payment of Accounting Costs Before Trial, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1411, 1421-26 (1998).
34 See Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor
John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 558-62 (2005).
35 See Leslie, supra note 3, at 79-84. But see Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the
Provision of Public Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 317 (1988) (arguing that simplicity of trust
decisions reduces the need for market monitoring of trustees).
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responsibility for monitoring the trustee. Moreover, with appropriate
language in the trust instrument, the protector might be able to avoid the
cost of litigation. The settlor, for instance, could require the trustee to
obtain the protector’s consent before taking particular actions and could
even give the protector power to remove the trustee without judicial
approval.36 In this way, the trust protector can serve, at least in theory,
as an efficient check on the agency costs associated with private express
trusts. It is this insight, and its doctrinal implications, that serves as the
focus for Part III.
C.

Statutory Recognition

Until recently, no American statute made any mention of trust
protectors. Over the last eight years, however, five states have enacted
statutes explicitly authorizing or defining trust protectors. South Dakota
enacted the first such statute in 1997,37 followed by Idaho in 1999,38
Alaska39 and Wyoming40 in 2003, and Tennessee in 2004.41 The Alaska
statute differs significantly from the statutes enacted in the other four
states. In the other states, the statutes insulate trustees—generally
denominated “excluded fiduciaries”—from liability for following
directions given to them by trust protectors.42 The Alaska statute
includes no comparable provision. The statutes also differ significantly
on the protectors’ own liabilities. The Alaska statute provides explicitly
that, subject to contrary provisions in the trust instrument, “a trust
protector is not liable or accountable as a trustee or fiduciary . . . .”43 By
36 Indeed, this might be the most common power conferred on the trust protector. See
Waters, supra note 22, at 105.
37 1997 S.D. Sess. Laws 280, § 1 (codified as amended at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1B-1
to 55-1B-5 (2005)).
38 1999 Idaho Sess. Laws 331, § 1 (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501 (2005)).
39 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws 130, § 1 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370 (2005)).
40 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 124, § 1 (codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710 – 410-718 (2005)).
41 The Tennessee statute, 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 537, § 66, as well as its Section Comment,
can be found at TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-808 (2005).
42 The Tennessee statute, based on the Uniform Trust Code, is somewhat equivocal. The
comment to the section tracks the comment to the UTC, which suggests that the trustee bears
minimal oversight responsibility. See text accompanying note 49, infra. But the text of the
statute includes a provision absent from the UTC. That provision insulates the trustee from
liability when following the directions of the protector. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-808(e).
The other statutes unequivocally insulate the trustee from liability for following the
protector’s directions. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501(2); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-5;
WYO. STAT ANN. §§ 4-10-715, 4-10-717. These states typically denominate trustees who have
received directions from a trust protector as “excluded fiduciaries.” See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 55-1B-1.
43 ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(d).
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contrast, statutes in the other four states direct that a protector should be
treated as a fiduciary unless the trust instrument provides to the
contrary.44
The Uniform Trust Code (UTC) also makes provision for trust
protectors. Although the trust protector label appears only in a
Comment,45 the statute itself speaks in terms of a trust that confers
“upon a person . . . power to direct certain actions of the trustee.”46 The
UTC does not provide trustees with absolute immunity from liability for
following the directions of a trust protector. Section 808 provides that
the trustee shall act in accordance with the exercise of a power held by a
protector “unless the attempted exercise is manifestly contrary to the
terms of the trust or the trustee knows the attempted exercise would
constitute a serious breach of a fiduciary duty that the person holding
the power owes to the beneficiaries of the trust.”47 Thus, the UTC
standard requires that the trustee exercise “minimal oversight
responsibility” before following the protector’s directions.48 Moreover,
the UTC creates a presumption that the holder of a “power to direct” is
a fiduciary.49
Most states, however, have made no statutory provision for
protectors and have not yet developed case law defining the
relationships among protectors, trustees, settlors, and beneficiaries.50
Moreover, even in states that have labeled protectors as fiduciaries, the
scope of the fiduciary duties owed by the protector remain substantially
uncertain. It is against that uncertainty that we turn to the role
protectors might play in controlling agency costs.

44 IDAHO CODE § 15-7-501(4); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, § 55-1B-4; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15808(d); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-711.
45 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 cmt. (2005).
46 Id. at § 808(b).
47 Id.
48 Id. at § 808 cmt.
49 Id. at § 808(d).
50 A Washington statute, however, provides, without mentioning trust protectors by that
name, that a person with a power to direct or control the acts of a fiduciary shall be deemed to be
a fiduciary. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.130 (West 2005).
Moreover, several states have expressly provided that when the trust instrument vests in
someone other than the trustee power to make investment decisions, the trustee should be treated
as an “excluded fiduciary” and should bear no liability for losses resulting from an investment
made by the direction of someone else with investment powers. Excluded fiduciary terminology
predates the advent of trust protectors, and appears in statutes in a number of states to insulate
trustees from liability when acting pursuant to a direction authorized by the trust instrument. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1-307 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-194 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1339.43 (LexisNexis 2005); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 114.003 (Vernon 2005); VA.
CODE ANN. § 26-5.2 (2006); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-9 (2005) (relieving trustee of
liability without using excluded fiduciary language).
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II. THE PROTECTOR AND AGENCY COSTS
A.

Monitoring the Trustee

1.

The Optimistic Model

Agency costs arise because it is often difficult for a principal to
observe whether the agent is acting on the principal’s behalf.51 The
principal could eliminate agency costs altogether by aligning the agent’s
compensation perfectly with the agent’s efforts, but that would
transform the agent into the principal; the original principal would no
longer have any interest in the agent’s actions. That, in turn, would
defeat the principal’s purpose in creating an agency relationship.
The best the principal can do is to assure that some system is in
place to monitor the agent’s performance and to accept some losses
resulting from the divergence between the interests of the principal and
the agent. If the cost of monitoring and the losses resulting from
divergence prove too great, the principal will not create the agency
relationship.
Private express trusts generate agency costs. The settlor cannot
observe the trustee’s behavior and does not want the trustee to reap the
benefits of the trustee’s decisions. Moreover, unlike corporate
fiduciaries, whose behavior as agents is often subject to market
discipline,52 the typical trustee faces little market pressure in the
performance of its duties.53 As a result, the success of the trust depends
on the strength of the mechanisms available for monitoring trustee
behavior. In the prevailing model, fiduciary duties enforceable by trust
beneficiaries provide that mechanism.54 The trustee’s duties of care,
loyalty, impartiality, and the duty to provide information to the
beneficiaries all operate to constrain a trustee who would otherwise
shirk or ignore the interests of the trustee’s principals.55
51
52

See Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 643-46.
See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 856-57 (1992).
53 See Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 643-46; Leslie, supra note 3, at 99.
54 See generally Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 483 (1990) (“A defining characteristic
of a trust arrangement is that the beneficiary has the legal power to enforce the trustee’s duty to
comply with the terms of the trust.”).
55 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (duty of
prudence); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (duty of
loyalty); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (duty of
impartiality); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (duty to
furnish information to beneficiaries).
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The prospect of fiduciary duty litigation, however, has several
deficiencies as a mechanism for assuring that the trustee acts in the
interest of the trust settlor. First, trustees understand that actions for
breach of fiduciary duty are costly to the beneficiaries, in more than one
way. Most obviously, the beneficiaries face litigation costs. If the
beneficiaries are ultimately successful in their effort to establish the
trustee’s breach, they may be able to recover those costs from the trust
or the trust estate.56 Recovery from the trust estate, however, would be
a hollow victory, because in most cases, the beneficiaries are the
equitable owners of the trust estate. Moreover, when the beneficiaries’
action proves unsuccessful, even the trustee’s defense costs will
ultimately be borne by the trust.57 Of perhaps equal importance, many
trust beneficiaries are dependent on the trustee, particularly if the trustee
enjoys discretion about distributions among beneficiaries.58 These
factors will lead rational, educated beneficiaries to refrain from bringing
breach of trust actions even when those actions have a reasonable
prospect of success, thereby resulting in under-deterrence of breach by
trustees.
Second, the assumption of rational, educated beneficiaries is a
heroic one. Many trust beneficiaries are the recipients of interests in a
trust for a reason (other than the potential tax advantages emerging from
56 Compare Shriner v. Dyer, 462 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (beneficiaries recover
litigation fees from trust, even after failing to recover them from trustees individually after
establishing trust mismanagement), and Palmer v. Hartford Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 279 A.2d
726 (Conn. 1971) (beneficiaries recover from the trust itself the litigation costs they incurred in
opposing proposed sale of trust property at a price far lower than price purchaser ultimately paid),
with Feinberg v. Adolph K. Feinberg Hotel Trust, 922 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (trustee’s
misappropriation of assets so reprehensible that it warranted ordering trustee to pay beneficiary’s
costs), and Reynolds v. First Ala. Bank, 471 So. 2d 1238 (Ala. 1985) (trustee bears beneficiaries’
attorneys fees in successful action for breach of fiduciary duty). See generally 3 SCOTT ON
TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 188.4 (“[W]here it is held that the trustee is subject to a surcharge, the
expense is payable by the trustee personally.”).
Some state statutes appear to mandate that the trustee bear the beneficiaries’ litigation
costs, including attorneys fees, in cases where the beneficiary has successfully maintained an
action for breach of trust. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-11(a)(4) (2005); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 17211(b) (West 2006). Other statutes appear to give reviewing courts discretion to assess the
successful beneficiaries’ litigation costs against the trustee. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12193(a)(4) (2005).
57 See, e.g., Jessup v. Smith, 119 N.E. 403, 404 (N.Y. 1918) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that
trustee was entitled to reimbursement for attorneys fees because the trustee “owed a duty to the
estate to stand his ground against unjust attack. He resisted an attempt to wrest the administration
of the trust from one selected by the testator and to place it in strange hands.”); Saulsbury v.
Denton Nat’l Bank, 335 A.2d 199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975); Weidlich v. Comley, 267 F.2d 133
(2d Cir. 1959); see also Carter, supra note 33, at 1421-26 (1998); 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra
note 28 § 188.4 (4th ed. 2001) (“The trustee can properly pay out of the trust estate expenses of
litigation incurred in a successful attempt to prevent the beneficiaries from subjecting the trustee
to a surcharge.”).
58 See generally Leslie, supra note 3, at 87.
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the marital deduction59 and the generation-skipping transfer tax
exemption60). If the trust settlor had confidence in the financial acumen
of the beneficiaries, the settlor might well have passed his assets to the
beneficiaries free of trust, eliminating the agency cost problem
altogether. Trustees as a group should understand the limited capacity
of trust beneficiaries, creating another potential for under-deterrence.
Third, the preferences of the trust beneficiaries may not perfectly
reflect the settlor’s preferences. If the trustee takes an action with the
approval of the trust beneficiaries, the trustee is unlikely to face an
action for breach of fiduciary duty; the settlor is dead, and may in any
event lack standing to bring action for breach.61 This fact, too, reduces
the value of fiduciary duty litigation, or its prospect, as a mechanism for
monitoring agency costs.
Appointment of a trust protector addresses and mitigates each of
these concerns. First, if the protector has power to direct the trustee to
take particular actions, or even power to veto particular actions, the
protector can avoid the litigation costs associated with actions for
breach of fiduciary duty. Second, the settlor can choose a protector
with the business acumen necessary to evaluate the actions taken by the
trustee. And third, the protector acts as the settlor’s surrogate; the
settlor can choose a protector whose focus is on achieving the settlor’s
objectives, even when those objectives conflict with the preferences of
the beneficiaries.
None of this is to suggest that appointment of a trust protector
eliminates agency costs from the settlor/trustee relationship. But on this
optimistic account, the protector operates to ameliorate significantly the
agency cost issues that confront the traditional trust. The protector
gives the settlor an additional tool in policing the trustee; if the tool
proves unhelpful, the settlor is no worse than she was before—she is
still left with the traditional mechanisms available for disciplining
trustees.
59
60
61

26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2000).
26 U.S.C. § 2631.
Established doctrine holds that a settlor who retains no beneficial interest in a trust cannot
bring an action against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty unless the settlor has entered into a
separate contract with the trustee to ensure the trustee’s performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. b. For applicaton of the rule, see, e.g., Sanders v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of
Leesburg, 585 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1991) (settlor of life insurance trust has no standing to
sue trustee for negligence and breach of trust); Edmondson v. Edmondson, 226 N.W.2d 615
(Minn. 1975) (settlor cannot maintain action for accounting when settlor lacked beneficial interest
in the trust). Professor Gaubatz has discussed a number of exceptions to the general rule against
settlor standing, and Professor Langbein has advocated that the traditional rule should be reversed
to authorize settlor standing in the absence of a contrary instruction in the trust instrument. See
John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law Setting, 62 N.C.
L. REV. 905 (1984); Langbein, supra note 9, at 664.
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Wrinkles in the Account

The optimistic account of the trust protector as a tool in the effort
to reduce agency costs ignores one important fact: the protector himself
is an agent. When a trust settlor names a trust protector, the settlor
creates
new
sets
of
relationships—settlor/protector,
beneficiary/protector, and trustee/protector—that complicate analysis of
agency costs. This section examines several of the complications.

a.

Disciplining the Protector

On the vast majority of trust issues, the settlor’s interests and those
of the beneficiary are closely aligned. In those cases, agency costs are
minimized when the protector acts as the settlor would want it to. But
what guarantee is there that the protector will do so? Personal loyalty to
the settlor acts to discipline the protector in some set of cases,
particularly when the protector is a close friend, confidant, or relative of
the settlor. But what of professional protectors, or successor protectors
who enjoy no strong personal bond to the settlor?
Even if the settlor were to provide detailed instructions to the
protector (which would defeat much of the purpose of appointing a
protector), there is no obvious market mechanism for assuring that the
protector follows the settlor’s instructions.62 The protector is not likely
to have a financial interest in complying with those instructions;
protector compensation cannot easily be tied to the degree of fealty the
protector displays towards the settlor’s wishes.63 Moreover, the
protector’s performance will often be impossible to measure.
In the absence of personal loyalty and market forces as
mechanisms to discipline protectors, legal liability rules provide an
alternative enforcement mechanism. Because the trust settlor will
generally be dead when significant decisions face the protector,
enforcement of duties will necessarily fall to the trust beneficiaries.
Beneficiary enforcement generates two familiar difficulties. First, even
62 Professors Gilson and Kraakman have made similar observations with respect to outside
corporate directors. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875-76 (1991) (noting absence of
evidence that market for outside directors exists at all); see generally Black, supra note 52, at
850-51 (noting that the effectiveness of agents watching agents depends in considerable measure
on institutional detail).
63 Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 62, at 875 (noting that corporations cannot pay outside
directors enough to create appropriate incentives to monitor management).
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when the interests of the trust beneficiaries are perfectly aligned with
those of the settlor, beneficiary enforcement replicates the costs
associated with fiduciary duty litigation against trustees. Second, when
the settlor’s apparent preferences diverge from the interests of the
beneficiaries, the more enforceable rights the legal regime confers on
the beneficiaries, the greater the incentives for the protector to act as the
agent of the beneficiaries rather than the agent of the settlor.
b.

Why Not Co-Trustees?

For the settlor who seeks to monitor trustee behavior, there is an
obvious alternative to appointment of a trust protector: appoint cotrustees, each of whom can monitor the other’s actions. Appointment of
co-trustees generates a number of advantages for the settlor. Unlike the
uncharted law surrounding trust protectors, there is a well-established
body of law governing the responsibilities of co-trustees. Because cotrustees are generally entitled to exercise trust powers only by consent
of a majority,64 no trustee can act without persuading co-trustees of the
merits of the action—assuring that no individual trustee will act
arbitrarily. Reinforcing that protection against arbitrary action is the
rule that makes one co-trustee liable for another co-trustee’s breach of
fiduciary duty if reasonable care would have prevented the breach.65
Moreover, one co-trustee is liable for another’s self-dealing, on the
theory that the disinterested trustee’s duty of care extends to assuring
that the co-trustee does not breach his duty of loyalty.66 In light of the
monitoring possibilities that accompany appointment of co-trustees,
why would a trust settlor find it attractive to appoint a protector instead?
64 At common law, trustees of private trusts could act only by unanimous consent. That rule,
however, has generally been abandoned by statute. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 10-10.7 (McKinney 2005) (providing that fiduciary powers may be exercised by majority of
fiduciaries); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39 (2003) (concurrence of both
trustees necessary when trust names two trustees; concurrence of majority necessary when there
are three or more trustees).
65 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81(2) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“Each
trustee also has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of
trust and, if a breach of trust occurs, to obtain redress.”); see also id. at cmt. e (establishing that
co-trustee is liable for trustee’s breaches if co-trustee participated or acquiesced in the breach,
improperly delegated administration to the breaching trustee, or enabled the trustee to commit the
breach by failing to exercise reasonable care); CAL. PROB. CODE § 16402 (Deering 2006). For
cases applying the general rules to hold co-trustees liable, see, e.g. Rutanen v. Ballard, 678
N.E.2d 133 (Mass. 1997) (co-trustee who abandoned administration duties to trustee and failed to
inform trustee of breach held liable for breach); Estate of Chrisman, 746 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988) (rejecting co-trustee’s argument that she should not be liable because she deferred to
decisions of co-trustee).
66 See, e.g., In re Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977); In re Durston’s Will, 74 N.E.2d 310
(N.Y. 1947).
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With respect to offshore trusts, especially those designed for asset
protection purposes, there is an obvious answer: appointing a domestic
co-trustee would increase the likelihood that a domestic court could
exert jurisdiction over the trust assets.67 Once removed from the asset
protection context, the reasons for appointing a protector instead of a
co-trustee become less apparent. In some commonwealth countries, but
not the United States, the conception of the trustee as a representative of
the interests of the beneficiaries, rather than the trust settlor, might lead
settlors to prefer protectors to co-trustees.68 Even in the United States,
cost might be a factor if one assumes that trustees are entitled to
commissions and protectors are not, but cost differences become less
significant when one recognizes that the settlor can generally set the
compensation of both protectors and trustees by private agreement.
From an agency cost perspective, the principal reason for choosing
to appoint a protector rather than a co-trustee is the difference in
decisionmaking structure that results from the protector/trustee
relationship. Co-trustees typically make decisions by consensus; each
has equal input into trust decisions; each is equally accountable for the
consequences of those decisions.69 The settlor, by contrast, may prefer
to repose primary decisionmaking responsibility in a single authority—
the trustee—subject only to intermittent review by the protector.70 The
authority model of decisionmaking reduces the need for the protector to
acquire and process information about every aspect of the trust,
effectively reducing monitoring costs.71 The settlor can use a protector
67 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1089-1100 (2000) (noting the difficulty in obtaining personal
jurisdiction over an offshore trustee, and exploring the possibility of obtaining in rem jurisdiction
over trust property).
68 See Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 662-63 (noting more significant deference given to beneficiary
wishes in English trusts). See generally 4 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 337:
The American courts have laid emphasis on the idea that the wishes of the settlor
should be controlling except where it would be opposed to some definite policy to give
effect to his desires. In England, on the other hand, the courts have felt that although
the extent of the interests of the beneficiaries depends on the intention of the settlor, the
control of their interests should be in their own hands, except where the interests of
others limit such control. In the United States the courts take the view that the settlor
can dispose of his property as he likes. In England the beneficiary of a trust can
dispose of his interest as he likes.
Id.
69 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (each trustee
has a right to participate in trust administration; each has a duty to prevent co-trustees from
committing breach, and also a duty to seek redress if breach occurs).
70 Geoffrey Manne has suggested a similar model for governance of charitable entities—a
contract relationship with a firm whose principal role is to monitor the behavior of charitable
boards. Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 227, 262-64 (1999).
71 Cf. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974) (discussing the advantages
of the authority model of decisionmaking).
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as a check on trustee behavior without making the protector a full
partner in trust decisionmaking. Moreover, the authority model—
trustee as decisionmaker with protector as a check—also limits (but
does not eliminate) the potential for quid-pro-quo decisionmaking by
co-trustees who have to interact on a regular basis with respect to trust
administration.72
Of course, the settlor could accomplish the same objectives by
naming co-trustees and carefully outlining, in the trust instrument, their
respective responsibilities. But that approach has its own drawbacks.
In particular, the settlor is unlikely to anticipate in advance all of the
ways in which the settlor seeks to alter the background law surrounding
co-trustees. As a result, the existence of an established body of cotrustee law becomes a negative, not an advantage. If the settlor wants to
depart significantly from the allocation of duties customarily borne by
co-trustees, the settlor may be better off avoiding the co-trustee label.73
c.

The Effect of the Protector on the Trustee’s Performance

In an ideal world, appointment of a protector would reduce agency
costs by providing additional incentives to the trustee to safeguard the
interests of the trust beneficiaries (thereby advancing the wishes of the
trust settlor). In practice, however, there is danger that appointment of
the protector could have the opposite effect—it could reduce the
incentives for the trustee to exercise prudence in managing the trust
assets.
The danger is three-fold. First, once a protector is appointed, the
trustee becomes, to varying degrees, accountable to the protector.74
72 Some trust protectors might ultimately find it in their financial interests to align themselves
with trustees rather than trust settlors. Neither the settlor nor the trust beneficiaries are likely to
be repeat players in their interactions with the professional trust protector. By contrast, as
protectors become more common, protectors and trustees will have ongoing relationships.
Especially if protectors are in a position to replace trustees, or to name successor trustees, there
will be significant reasons for trustees to ingratiate themselves with protectors, creating symbiotic
relationships. These relationships, however, are unlikely to inure to the benefit of the settlor and
trust beneficiaries.
73 Of course, even if the trust instrument eschews the co-trustee label, courts are likely to
draw analogies to co-trustees. See, e.g., Gathright’s Trustee v. Gaut, 124 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1939) (trust advisors considered as co-trustees with limited authority); Lewis v. Hanson,
128 A.2d 819, 828 (Del. 1957), aff’d sub nom. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (trust
advisor a fiduciary “in the nature of a co-trustee . . . .”).
74 Kenneth Arrow has described the problem associated with a regime in which a supposed
decisionmaker is held accountable for every action he takes: “If every decision of A is to be
reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B and hence
no solution to the original problem.” ARROW, supra note 71, at 78.
If the initial assumption is that the trustee was selected as the person or institution best
suited to making a class of decisions, holding the trustee accountable to a person less suited to
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That accountability may lead the trustee to be responsive to the
protector’s wishes even when the trustee believes that the protector’s
preferences diverge from the interests of the beneficiaries (and the
settlor). Especially if the settlor has chosen the trustee because of the
trustee’s expertise in making the decisions delegated to him, making the
trustee accountable to the protector threatens to reduce the quality of the
trustee’s decisions.
Second, even a trustee who is resolute about maintaining
independence from the protector will be inclined to expend energy
persuading the protector of the merits of the trustee’s decision. That is,
if the trustee concludes that its ultimate obligation is to the beneficiaries
(or the settlor), the trustee will best promote the interests of the
beneficiaries and settlor if it assures that the protector does not interfere
with the trustee’s decisions. That, in turn, diverts the trustee’s energies
from its primary function: making appropriate investment and
distribution decisions.75
Third, appointment of a protector can lead to inefficient diffusion
of responsibility, with the trustee expending less care in making
investment and distribution decisions, expecting that the protector will
review those decisions in any event. (Conversely, the protector may
rely on the trustee’s care and prudence in making the initial
determination.)
The extent to which the appointment of a protector threatens to
reduce the quality of the trustee’s decisions varies with the powers
accorded the protector. The most obvious threat arises when the trust
instrument gives the protector power to direct the trustee’s investment
and/or distribution decisions. Once the protector exercises that power,
the trustee could reasonably conclude that the trustee’s duty is to follow
the protector’s directions, not to exercise independent judgment about
the wisdom of the protector’s decisions.76 The trustee might be
especially inclined to follow the protector’s directions in cases where
the protector has power to replace the trustee. In effect, the trustee
could behave as the protector’s agent, not as a watchdog for the interests
of the beneficiaries.
make the decision can generate perverse results. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 107-09 (2004)
(identifying the difficult tradeoffs between authority and accountability in the corporate setting).
75 For a similar point with regard to corporate decisionmakers, see Donald C. Langevoort,
The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 813 (2001) (observing that when more
monitors of corporate CEOs are in place, CEOs spend more time influencing monitors and less
time engaging in more productive tasks).
76 Indeed, if the settlor gives the protector power to direct investment decisions, the trustee
will generally be obligated to follow those directions. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 75 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
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Even when the trust instrument limits the protector to veto power,
the trustee might exercise less care than the trustee would otherwise
exercise, expecting that a particularly imprudent decision would be
vetoed by the protector, and that, in any event, the trustee could use the
protector’s failure to veto as evidence of the prudence of the trustee’s
initial decision.
The danger that appointment of a protector will diminish the
quality of the trustee’s decisions does not establish that protectors
inevitably increase agency costs. But the danger does have two
significant implications. First, settlors and their lawyers should take
care, both in the selection of trustees and protectors, and in the
allocation of power between trustees and protectors, to minimize the
danger. In many circumstances, appointment of a protector may prove
unnecessary or counterproductive.77 Second, courts (and, perhaps,
legislatures) should structure the legal incidents of the relationship
between trustees and protectors with these agency costs in mind.
Section IV focuses on that issue of doctrine.
B.

The Trust Protector and the Settlor’s Foresight

A trust settlor might appoint a trust protector to perform functions
entirely unrelated to monitoring the trustee’s performance. For
instance, the settlor might confer on a protector the power to modify or
terminate the trust, to change the trust’s situs, or to make discretionary
distributions to particular beneficiaries. The settlor might name a
protector with these powers for the same reason a settlor might create a
power of appointment: to assure that the trust is responsive to
information not available to the settlor at the time the settlor creates the
trust.
The settlor, for instance, will not be in a position to foresee the
details of tax law changes that might make continuation of the trust on
its current terms superfluous or even counterproductive. Nor can the
settlor anticipate changes in state law—perhaps with respect to creditor
claims or trust duration—that might make it desirable to change the
trust’s location.
A settlor’s imperfect foresight extends beyond changes in law.
Trust assets could change significantly in value after creation of the
trust, in ways that would alter the settlor’s distributional preferences, or
even, in some circumstances, lead to termination of the trust. The
circumstances of the trust beneficiaries might also change in ways that
77 Cf. Waters, supra note 22, at 105 (noting that settlors might reasonably fear that
appointment of a protector would “add one more layer of costs and bureaucracy”).
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would alter the settlor’s preferred distribution. If, for instance, the
settlor created a generation-skipping trust on the assumption that
settlor’s children would be sufficiently wealthy to benefit from the trust,
the settlor’s preferences might change markedly if one or more of
settlor’s children were to encounter financial setbacks. The tax
advantages associated with the generation-skipping transfer tax
exemption would then fade in importance.
To account for changes like these, the settlor could include in the
trust instrument first, a statement of the trust’s purposes, and second, an
authorization for one or more trust beneficiaries to petition for judicial
modification or termination of the trust if the terms of the trust no
longer serve those purposes.78 But that approach entails significant
legal costs, and also reposes in courts judgment calls that the settlor
might rather repose in a trust protector—someone who might be closer
to the family, or someone with more tax or financial expertise.
When a settlor appoints a protector to compensate for his lack of
foresight, the issue is not whether the protector will effectively monitor
the trustee’s performance; the protector’s responsibilities are
independent of the trustee’s actions. Instead, from an agency cost
perspective, the issue is how best to assure that the protector will act as
a faithful agent. In the first instance, that is an issue for the settlor and
the settlor’s lawyers in drafting the trust instrument. But legal doctrine
also has a role to play in minimizing agency costs.
III. SHAPING DOCTRINE
A.

Introduction

The trust instrument itself provides a starting point for determining
the legal liabilities of the trust protector. Indeed, it would be reasonable
to start with the assumption that the judicial role in regulating trust
protectors should be the role specified by the settlor in the trust
instrument. That is, the protector’s liabilities are largely a matter of
contract, capable of careful articulation in the trust instrument. But
many trust instruments are silent, or incomplete, about the liabilities of
the protector.79 Moreover, even if a trust instrument were to include
language purporting to determine the protector’s liabilities, there is
78 Cf. id. at 666 (noting that in the trust context, “using courts to provide flexibility is
marginal”); Rock & Wachter, supra note 23, at 664 (discussing possibility of judicial
reformation).
79 See Duckworth, supra note 12, at 174 (noting that it is “not the usual practice for the trust
instrument to lay down comprehensive rules”).
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good reason to believe, in light of the limited experience with trust
protectors, that neither the settlor nor the settlor’s lawyer will have fully
anticipated the range of issues that might arise in conjunction with the
protector’s action and inaction. As a result, courts will inevitably
develop a set of default rules to deal with trust protectors, and those
rules may sometimes take on a “mandatory” character, displacing
explicit instructions in the trust instrument. My objective in this section
is to offer a tentative sketch of the legal regime that should surround
trust protectors, drawing both on agency cost concepts, and on existing
fiduciary duty law.
As we have seen, the protector’s role with respect to management
issues differs significantly from its role with respect to distribution
issues. The trustee is the primary manager of the trust assets, and the
protector’s role is primarily that of a monitor. By contrast, when the
trust instrument confers on the protector the power to alter the trust’s
distribution scheme, the protector becomes the primary decisionmaker,
not a monitor of trustee behavior. This difference has implications for
the legal framework surrounding the two issues, and suggests that the
two sets of issues should be discussed separately.
B.

The Protector’s Power with Respect to Management Issues
1.

The Analytical Framework

Trust instruments frequently give trust protectors the power to
direct or veto portfolio management decisions made by the trustee. Any
evaluation of the protector’s legal responsibilities with respect to these
powers requires attention to two separate but related questions: first,
how should an appropriately responsive protector behave with respect to
the power conferred on him by the trust instrument; and second, what
legal liabilities will induce the appropriate behavior? In familiar terms,
these questions reduce to what standard of behavior the protector should
employ, and what standard of review of the protector’s actions will
induce that standard of behavior.80
Consider first the standard of behavior.
With respect to
management issues, the settlor’s primary concern will generally be to
provide maximum return to the trust beneficiaries.
Thus, on
management issues, where the settlor’s interests and those of the
beneficiaries are closely aligned, the legal framework should generally
80 Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993) (examining policies behind
divergent standards of conduct and review in corporate cases).
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aim to have the protector behave as the settlor would want the protector
to behave.81
How would the typical settlor want the protector to behave with
respect to the powers the settlor has conferred upon the protector? A
first possibility is that the settlor wants the protector to act as a trustee
would act, scrutinizing each investment decision as if the protector were
the primary decisionmaker, doing the research necessary to identify the
most prudent decision and then exercising the protector’s powers to
assure that the trustee or trustees make that decision. A second, polar
opposite, possibility is that the settlor had no expectations of the
protector; that the settlor wanted the protector to have complete freedom
to act, or not to act, to suit the protector’s pleasure. A third alternative
is that the settlor wanted the protector to defer to the trustee’s decisions,
even when the protector disagreed with those decisions, acting only
when the trustee’s decision amounted to an abuse of discretion, or
exceeded the bound of reasonableness, or some comparable standard.
That is, the settlor might have wanted the protector to act only in those
situations in which, absent a protector, a court would intervene to
protect trust beneficiaries.
If the typical settlor would opt for the first standard of behavior—
the protector acts as a trustee would act—determining the standard of
review would be easy: use the same standard applied to review trustee
decisions. When the issue relates to the trustee’s duty to invest
prudently, courts typically intervene only when the trustee has abused
its discretion.82 That abuse of discretion standard is designed to
preserve primary decisionmaking responsibility in the trustee, not the

81 There may, of course, be cases in which the trust settlor has a strong, but idiosyncratic,
belief that a particular investment strategy is in the interest of the trust beneficiaries, or that the
trustee should pursue a particular strategy even if it is not in the interest of the beneficiaries. The
classic case is In re Pulitzer’s Estate, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), in which Joseph Pulitzer
directed that the trustee not have the power to sell shares in his newspaper corporation. These are
cases, however, in which the settlor is likely to provide express and clear instructions in the trust
instrument rather than entrusting enforcement of his wishes to a trust protector.
Suppose, however, the settlor were to include such directions and empower the protector to
enforce them. Doctrinal limitations on dead-hand control prevent the settlor, as principal, from
imposing particular restrictions on one form of agent (the trustee). See generally John H.
Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1118-19 (2004).
There would seem to be little reason, then, to suggest that the protector—another form of agent
—should have more power than the principal to evade these limits on dead-hand control.
Moreover, any attempt by the protector to enforce the settlor’s directions would be met
with litigation by the trustee, concerned about the trustee’s own liability for causing depletion of
trust assets. If the result of such litigation would be to require that the trustee ignore the settlor’s
instructions (and those of the protector), then the protector would have served no purpose by
seeking to enforce the restrictions. In that circumstance, it would appear peculiar to assume that
the settlor would have wanted the protector to take futile actions.
82 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
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reviewing court, while nevertheless holding the trustee accountable for
its decisions.83
If the typical settlor would opt for the second standard of
behavior—the protector acts at the protector’s pleasure—determining
the standard of review would also be easy: relieve the protector from all
fiduciary duty, and insulate the protector from suit altogether.
Assuming that the settlor would opt for the first standard of
behavior, however, is inconsistent with the settlor’s decision to appoint
a protector rather than a co-trustee. If the settlor had wanted the
protector to duplicate the behavior of a trustee, the settlor would have
named the protector a trustee.
More plausible, in at least some circumstances, is the assumption
that the settlor would opt for the second standard of behavior—the
protector acts at his pleasure. Settlor might so indicate in the trust
instrument.84 Or, even without an express indication in the trust
instrument, the relationship of the settlor and the beneficiary may make
it clear that settlor was prepared to repose complete confidence in the
protector.85 Alternatively, the rights conferred on the protector may
make it clear that settlor intended to enable the protector to act purely
out of self-interest—as where the protector is the trust’s principal
beneficiary.86
In these circumstances, determining the appropriate standard of
review is also easy: courts should not intervene to reverse any action or
inaction by the protector, and should not impose liability on the
protector for action or inaction. Put in other terms, the court should
conclude that the protector is not accountable to the trust beneficiaries
for his actions; the protector is not bound by fiduciary duties.87
In most circumstances, however, this second assumption—that
the settlor intended for the protector to act, or not act, without regard to
the settlor’s purposes—is as implausible as the assumption that the
83 See id. at cmt. b (“[J]udicial intervention is not warranted merely because the court would
have differently exercised the discretion.”); cf. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for
Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 834 (2004) (noting comparable reasons for the
business judgment rule in the corporate context: “litigation on substantive decisions, and even on
duty of care issues, would be about matters on which reasonable people would disagree. . . .
[N]either judges nor shareholders are likely to be capable of making better decisions than the
professionals charged with running the business.”).
84 Cf. Bove, supra note 27, at 392-93.
85 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. c(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (power
given to settlor’s widow or widower to prevent sale of residential property held in the trust by
refusing to consent to its sale would presumptively be a power for the benefit of the occupantpower holder, and thus not a power held in a fiduciary capacity).
86 See Bove, supra note 27, at 392-93.
87 The settlor will often want to avoid this conclusion in order to assure that the protector
does not hold a general power of appointment, which could generate adverse tax consequences.
See id. at 395.
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settlor intended the protector to be an additional trustee. Taken to its
extreme, such an assumption could leave the protector as a principal
beneficiary of the trust: the protector could agree to exercise his powers
in accordance with the preferences of the highest bidder. Even if a
settlor were prepared to endorse such behavior with the initial handpicked protector, it is difficult to attribute to the settlor assumption of
such a risk with any successor protector.
In most circumstances, therefore, the most likely alternative is that
the settlor intends for the protector to defer to the trustee’s judgment
most of the time. The settlor reposes in the protector powers that
constrain the trustee’s management decisions not because the settlor
expects the protector to exercise those powers, but because the existence
of those powers will increase the trustee’s responsiveness to the
interests of the trust beneficiaries (and ultimately to the settlor’s
wishes).
Typically, the settlor is not attempting to shift all
decisionmaking responsibility from the trustee to the protector; such a
shift would simply replicate the agency costs in a traditional trust that
has no protector. Instead, the settlor presumably expects the protector
to monitor trustee behavior without displacing the discretion ordinarily
reposed in the trustee—the person or institution selected by the settlor to
manage the trust assets. That is, the settlor expects the protector to
assume a monitoring role comparable to the role a court might play,
absent the attendant litigation costs. Accordingly, the settlor expects the
protector to intervene only when the trustee has abused its discretion.
The question, then, is how to structure the legal liabilities of trustee and
protector to minimize the sum of agency and monitoring costs.
Unfortunately, the standards for judicial review of the protector’s
actions that flow from this assumption about the preferred standard of
protector behavior are not self-evident. Absolving the protector of legal
accountability for his actions—based on the assumption that settlors
typically appoint protectors to avoid the costs associated with judicial
enforcement of a trustee’s fiduciary duties—provides the protector with
license to act in ways that are contrary to the settlor’s wishes and the
beneficiaries’ interests.88 As we have seen, the no accountability
88 Moreover, it is not clear that such a regime would ultimately avoid litigation costs.
Whenever the protector’s instruction appears sufficiently inimical to the interests of the trust
beneficiaries, the trustee would have an incentive to seek judicial instructions in order to avoid
the trustee’s own liability for following the protector’s instructions.
A trustee is entitled to seek instructions whenever he has reasonable doubt regarding any
matter relating to administration of the trust. See Adler v. Adler, 713 N.E.2d 348 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999). These matters can include the construction of the trust instrument, the extent of the
trustee’s duties or powers, the identity and interests of the beneficiaries, or the resolution of a
dispute among beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 71 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2005); Patterson v. Polk, 317 S.W.2d 286 (Ark. 1958); Lowe v. Johnson, 469 N.E.2d 768 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984); In re Merlin A. Abadie Inter Vivos Trust, 791 So. 2d 181 (La. Ct. App. 2001). A
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standard is the appropriate standard of review when the settlor expects
the protector to act in the protector’s own self-interest. But a standard
of review that holds the protector liable when he has not acted with the
care, skill, and caution the law normally demands of trustees effectively
induces the protector to intervene in every trust decision, not to act as a
monitor of trustee behavior.89
To induce protectors to function as settlors intend them to
function—as monitors of trustee behavior—trust law must devise and
apply a more deferential standard of review than that applied to trustees.
The precise standard will differ depending on the powers the settlor has
conferred on the protector. What is critical to recognize, however, is
that routine transplantation to protectors of the fiduciary standards
applied to trustees would represent an analytical error.90 To the extent
settlors expect protectors to play a role distinct from trustees, the
standard of review applied to the protector’s actions must reflect that
distinction.
2.

Requirements that the Trustee Secure Protector’s Consent

Consider first the trust settlor who seeks to constrain the trustee’s
power by requiring the trustee to obtain the protector’s consent before
taking specified actions. For instance, the trust instrument might
require the trustee to obtain the protector’s consent before changing the
trust’s investment portfolio. Or, the trust instrument might require the
protector’s consent before the trustee engages in a more limited set of
transactions, such as the sale of shares of a closely-held corporation in

trustee’s ignorance of the terms of the trust will not shield him from liability for breach of duty
when he fails to seek instructions. See In re Marriage of Petrie, 19 P.3d 443 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001). However, in the absence of fraud or concealment, seeking instructions demonstrates good
faith on the part of the trustee and shields him from liability. See In re Riordan’s Trusteeship,
248 N.W. 21 (Iowa 1933); Willis v. Braucher, 87 N.E. 185 (Ohio 1909).
89 Professors Johnson and Millon have recently argued that, in the corporate context,
fiduciary duty standards for corporate officers should be more stringent than those applied to
corporate directors. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005). They argue, in particular, that corporate
officers—the corporation’s primary decisionmakers—should be liable for ordinary negligence,
while corporate directors should face a looser “gross negligence” standard. Id. at 1630-31. They
justify this distinction by noting that “officers bear primary responsibility for stewardship of the
corporation’s business activities,” while the board or directors, “meeting only occasionally and
lacking intimate knowledge of the corporation’s activities, is incapable of managing the publicly
held corporation in a direct manner.” Id. at 1637-38. That is, they see the standard of review
designed for optimal monitoring as different from the standard appropriate for primary
management activity.
90 Cf. id. at 1600-01 (decrying the failure of courts and commentators to distinguish between
duties of officers and those of directors, despite significant differences in institutional function).
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which the settlor was a principal. In these cases, the settlor might be
relying on the protector’s investment expertise.
In other cases, the settlor might authorize the trustee to engage in
self-dealing transactions, but only with the protector’s consent. Or the
settlor might require the protector’s consent before the trustee could
make particular distributions of income or principal. In each of these
situations, the settlor’s appointment of the protector avoids the need for
judicial monitoring of the trustee’s actions, and hence has the potential
to reduce agency costs.
When the settlor conditions the trustee’s power to act on obtaining
the protector’s consent, the protector’s position most closely resembles
that of a co-trustee.91 In both situations, the settlor is unwilling to
repose all responsibility for management of trust assets in a single
person or entity, and requires a single trustee to persuade another
party—either a co-trustee or a protector—before taking a significant
action with respect to trust assets. From a standard of behavior
perspective, the settlor expects the protector to evaluate the trustee’s
proposed action with the care ordinarily expected of a trustee; the settlor
does not contemplate inaction or deference by the protector. The
protector’s inaction would paralyze the trust. To take an extreme case,
suppose the protector simply refused to respond to all requests by the
trustee.92 It appears inconceivable that the settlor intended to relegate
the trustee to seeking judicial approval of its actions—especially when
the principal reason for appointing the protector is to avoid the
monitoring costs associated with judicial review.93
Conversely, the settlor does not expect the protector to act as a
rubber stamp on decisions made by the trustee. When the settlor
requires the trustee to seek explicit approval from the protector, the
settlor typically expects the protector to exercise his best judgment in
evaluating the trustee’s recommendation.94 That is, the settlor expects
the protector to act with the prudence required of a co-trustee. And
when the settlor appoints co-trustees, both the standard of behavior and
the standard of review are well-established, subject to express
provisions in the trust instrument relieving one or more of the trustees
from responsibility for particular actions.95 A comparable legal regime
91 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (If the
terms of the trust do not permit the trustee to act without the direction or consent of the fiduciary
power holder, the “designated person’s fiduciary duties and liabilities with respect to the power
are generally comparable to those of a trustee.”).
92 Duckworth, supra note 12, at 249.
93 Id. at 178.
94 Cf. 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 185 (The power holder abuses discretion if, “in
exercising or failing to exercise the power he acts dishonestly or from an improper motive or fails
to use his judgment or acts beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment.”).
95 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“When a
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appears appropriate for trust protectors: when the instrument conditions
the trustee’s power to act on the consent of the protector, the protector
must act with prudence in giving or withholding consent, and must act
not out of self-interest, but instead in the interest of the trust
beneficiaries. Moreover, the protector’s duties should expose the
protector to parallel liabilities for consenting and for failing to
consent.96 The settlor who requires the protector’s consent expects an
exercise of judgment; a failure to exercise that judgment with prudence
and loyalty exposes the protector to liability whether the protector has
followed a course of action or a course of inaction.97

3.

The Protector’s Power to Initiate Action

Rather than requiring the protector to approve or disapprove
actions taken by the trustee, the trust instrument might confer on the
protector power to initiate action with respect to trust management. In
this situation, unlike the situation in which the settlor has required the
trustee to obtain the protector’s consent before acting, the settlor has
conferred on the protector discretion to act, or not to act.98 Although the
protector has fiduciary duties in either instance, the standard of review
applied to the protector’s failure to act should differ significantly from
the standard applied when the protector initiates a self-interested or
imprudent action.99
trust has multiple trustees, the fiduciary duties of trustees stated in this Chapter, except as
modified by the terms of the trust, apply to each of the trustees.”); Waters, supra note 22, at 72,
84; 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 185.
96 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (Power
holder whose consent is a predicate for trustee action is liable for losses to the trust as a result of
the power holder’s breach of fiduciary duty “whether as a result of improper exercise of the
power or improper failure to exercise it.”).
97 Cf. Sherry v. Little, 167 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. 1960).
98 Sometimes, the protector’s position may be a hybrid, imposing on the protector no explicit
obligation to approve or direct investments, but providing that the trustee cannot take action
without the protector’s approval. See Duckworth, supra note 12, at 253 (Example 2).
99 The Restatement endorses a differential standard for the protector’s actions and failures to
act, but offers a somewhat different formulation:
If the terms of the power merely authorize the designated person to direct a trustee who
is otherwise under a duty to proceed with the administration of the trust so long as the
power is not exercised, ordinarily the only duty of the power holder is not to exercise
the power in a manner inconsistent with the fiduciary duties owed to one or more of the
beneficiaries.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). The Comment
goes on to suggest, however, that the power holder may have an affirmative duty to act “when the
power holder knows or should know that the purposes of the power call for some action to be
taken.” Id.
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The Protector’s Failure to Act

When the trustee may not act without the protector’s approval, the
protector’s inaction has the potential to paralyze trust administration.
By contrast, when the trust instrument confers on the protector the
power to initiate actions, the protector’s failure to exercise that power
will not prevent the trustee from administering the trust.100 The trustee
can continue to make decisions about investments and distributions
without securing approval from the protector.
Suppose, for instance, the trust instrument gives the protector
power to require the trustee to make particular investments, or power to
remove the trustee. The settlor does not expect the protector to exercise
these powers, unless unanticipated circumstances arise. If the trustee
acts prudently and loyally, the protector will never have occasion to
exercise these powers. Suppose, however, the trustee acts disloyally or
imprudently. What are the trust protector’s responsibilities?
First, how much investigation into the trustee’s actions is the
protector obligated to conduct? The settlor might reasonably expect the
protector to know the content of the trust portfolio, but it is unlikely that
the settlor expects the protector to make efforts to determine the
marketability of assets held by the trust in order to assure adequate
diversification. Nor is it likely that the settlor expects the protector to
familiarize himself with the trustee’s personal portfolio to determine
whether the trustee has engaged in self-dealing.101
Second, even if the protector believes that the trustee has made an
unreasonable investment decision, it is not clear that the settlor would
want the protector to direct the trustee to reverse that decision. Imagine
a trustee who has sold trust property to himself as an individual, or to an
entity in which the trustee holds a financial interest. Assume further
100 The Restatement distinguishes between these two situations in Comment f, where one
paragraph deals with cases in which “the terms of the trust do not permit the trustee to act without
the direction or consent of” the power holder, and the following paragraph deals with a trust in
which “the terms of the power merely authorize the designated person to direct a trustee who is
otherwise under a duty to proceed with the administration of the trust so long as the power is not
exercised. . . .” Id.
101 Nor is the trustee likely to inform the protector of such self-dealing unless the trustee
believes that the protector will approve the self-dealing and insulate the protector from liability.
Consider also, in the corporate context, Professor Eisenberg’s observation that
in those cases in which the board is called upon to approve a self-interested transaction
involving principal senior executives, the board’s sole source of advice may be the
proponent of the transaction. In short, unlike the typical business decision, in
determining whether to approve a self-interested transaction involving principal senior
executives, disinterested directors may receive only self-interested advice.
Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 453.
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that the protector knows of the trustee’s self-dealing, but believes that
the trustee has paid the trust an adequate price for the property.102 Or,
imagine a trustee who has retained in the trust portfolio a heavy
concentration of real estate previously owned by the settlor, or of stock
in a few closely-held corporations.103 The protector believes that the
trustee has retained these assets for longer than reasonably necessary,
and that as a result, the trust portfolio is not adequately diversified. In
these hypothetical situations, the protector knows of the trustee’s
breach, or has reason to suspect breach, and has power to act, either by
removing the trustee or by directing the trustee to make other
investment decisions. In each case, however, the settlor might prefer
that the protector refrain from acting.
The protector may have reasons—rooted in the beneficiaries’ best
interests—for deferring to the trustee’s decision even if the protector
believes that those decisions reflect a breach of fiduciary duty.
Especially if the trustee is solvent, the protector may conclude that the
beneficiaries will be better off as a result of the trustee’s decision. The
protector (like the settlor) may have confidence in the trustee’s
investment instincts, however inconsistent with modern portfolio
theory, and may conclude that allowing the trustee’s decision to stand
will leave the beneficiaries better off: if the trustee’s instincts pay off,
the beneficiaries profit, while if they do not, the trustee is liable for
breach. The trustee’s liability itself is a mechanism for diversifying the
beneficiaries’ risks.
In some ways, the protector’s position is akin to that of a reviewing
court facing a challenge to the action of a corporate officer or director.
The officers and directors have primary responsibility for running the
corporation, and courts are loathe to interfere with their business
judgments even if those judgments appear—from the court’s
perspective—to be unreasonable.104 As a result, courts apply the
102 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt b. (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005)
(“[U]nder the so-called ‘no-further inquiry’ principle it is immaterial that the trustee may be able
to show that the action in question was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were
fair, and that no profit resulted to the trustee.”).
103 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(b) (1992) (embracing duty to diversify); id.
§ 229 (setting forth duty, within reasonable time, to make and implement decisions concerning
retention and disposition of original assets to comply with duties in sections 227 and 228).
104 There are a number of reasons for this reluctance—first, “it may be hard for judges to
differentiate bad business decisions from good business decisions that turn out badly.” William
T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due
Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of
Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV 449, 454 (2002). Second, judges and other decisionmakers
may have a “hindsight bias” that might lead to imposition of liability even when none is
warranted. Id. at 455. Third, interference with business judgments on an ordinary negligence
standard would lead to excessive risk aversion by corporate officials. Id. Ultimately, the result
might be reluctance to serve as a director. Id.; see also Velasco, supra note 83, at 833-34; Rock

2790

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:6

business judgment rule and defer to those decisions without an inquiry
into their reasonableness.105 In effect, courts abstain from deciding
whether the decisions are reasonable in order to preserve the decisionmaking authority of the corporation’s primary decision makers.106
The analogy, of course, is less than perfect; significant differences
exist between trustees and corporate officers.107 In particular, while
decisions made by corporate officers are often sui generis,108 protocols
exist—no self-dealing, diversification of portfolio—by which protectors
can measure trustee behavior. In addition, corporate officers and
directors are subject to market monitoring not typically available with
respect to trustees.109
Nevertheless, it remains true that if the protector has a
responsibility to act whenever the protector concludes that an actual or
prospective decision of the trustee would be inconsistent with the
interests of the beneficiaries, the protector is in effect assuming the
primary decisionmaking responsibility for the trust. The trustee knows
that the protector will exercise its powers whenever the trustee does not
anticipate the protector’s preferences. As a result, the trustee has every
incentive to seek the protector’s blessing before making any decision,
effectively ceding any discretion the trust instrument conferred upon the
trustee, and ignoring the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The
protector effectively becomes a replacement for the trustee rather than a
monitor of trustee behavior. The result is to make the protector an
additional intermediary who adds little value; on the contrary, if the
settlor chose the trustee because the settlor valued the trustee’s
investment and administrative skills, substituting the protector for the
trustee might reduce the trust’s value to the settlor and the beneficiaries.

& Wachter, supra note 23, at 667-68. For the suggestion that these reasons apply with lesser
force to officers than to directors, see Johnson & Millon, supra note 89, at 1642.
105 See generally Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 443 (Under a business judgment standard, “a
director or officer will not be liable for a decision that resulted in a loss to the corporation, even if
the decision is unreasonable.”); Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 108 (The business judgment rule
“protect[s] those who make errors of judgment, even when those errors rise to the level of
negligence”).
106 See Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 108 (stating that the business judgment rule is justified
because judicial review threatens free exercise of managerial power).
107 See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market
Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 577 (2003); Leslie, supra note 3, at 77-88; Rock & Wachter, supra
note 23, at 664-68.
108 See Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 444 (noting that because business decisions are unique,
corporate decisionmakers can rarely shield themselves by showing that they followed accepted
protocols or practices).
109 Compare Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 122 (noting that “[m]arket forces work an imperfect
Darwinian selection on corporate decision makers”), and Macey, supra note 35, at 317-20, with
Leslie, supra note 3, at 77-88, and Sitkoff, supra note 107, at 677-78.

2006]

TRUST PROTECTORS

2791

From an agency cost perspective, it is difficult to imagine that a
typical settlor would want such an activist protector. If the settlor did
want such an activist protector, the settlor would be more likely to
prohibit the trustee from acting without the protector’s consent, or to
make the protector a co-trustee. A better assumption is that the typical
settlor wants the protector to intervene only in cases where the protector
can discern no rational basis for the trustee’s action.110
This assumption about appropriate protector behavior leads to a
deferential standard of review of the protector’s decision not to act: the
protector should be liable for breach by failing to act only if the
protector has made no reasonable inquiry into the trustee’s behavior111
or if no reasonable person would fail to act on the facts available to the
protector.112 So long as protector can establish a reasonable basis for
failing to act—and deference to the judgment of the trustee will qualify
as such a reasonable basis, unless that judgment is plainly inconsistent
with the interests of the trust beneficiaries—the protector’s failure to act
should not subject the protector to liability.113
b.

The Protector’s Actions

Unlike the protector who fails to act, a protector who exercises a
power conferred on him by the trust instrument takes affirmative
responsibility for managing some aspect of the trust. It would be
peculiar to assume that a settlor would expect that a protector who takes
on that responsibility would exercise less prudence than other
fiduciaries in discharging management functions. That is, if a protector
directs a trustee to make particular investments, the typical settlor would
expect that the protector’s behavior would be governed by the duties of
110 Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 442 (noting that even the business judgment rule requires
that the decision be rational, even if unreasonable).
111 To assert the protection of rules designed to protect the exercise of judgment,
decisionmakers generally have to show that they have exercised that judgment by making a
conscious decision based on a reasonable inquiry. See Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 441 (“[A]
director’s failure to make due inquiry, or any other simple failure to take action—as opposed to a
decision not to act—does not qualify for the protection of the [business judgment] rule.”);
Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 99 (“[Directors] may only invoke the business judgment rule when
they have made a conscious decision.”).
112 Some commentators have described the business judgment review standard as one that
examines decisionmaker actions for “rationality” rather than “reasonableness”; for them, an
irrational decision is “one that is so blatantly imprudent that it is inexplicable, in the sense that no
well-motivated and minimally informed person could have made it.” Allen, Jacobs & Strine,
supra note 104, at 452.
113 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“[T]here
may be an affirmative duty to act when the power holder knows or should know that the purposes
of the power call for some action to be taken.”).
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care, loyalty, and impartiality that would constrain a trustee.114 And if
the standard of behavior expected of protectors who exercise
management responsibility is the same as the standard expected of
trustees, courts have strong reasons to apply the same standard of
review: that is, the protector should be liable for the same behavior that
would generate liability in trustees.115
Sometimes, the management responsibilities assumed by the
protector will have direct analogues to responsibilities typically borne
by trustees—as when the protector directs the trustee to make particular
investments, or when the protector exercises discretion in directing the
distribution of trust assets. With respect to these decisions, the
protector’s behavior should be governed by the duties of care, loyalty,
and impartiality that would constrain a trustee.116
At other times, the protector will act in a way that is not directly
analogous to any action a trustee might take. In these instances, too, the
protector bears fiduciary responsibilities, but precedent from existing
trust law is less likely to be helpful in defining those responsibilities.
Consider, for instance, the protector who removes an existing trustee.117
That removal necessarily imposes costs on the trust—as for the
accounting necessary to resolve the respective liabilities of the old and
new trustees. The protector should be obligated to explain why
incurring these costs was in the interest of the trust beneficiaries; if the
protector cannot offer a plausible explanation, the protector has
breached its duty to those beneficiaries.118
One might object that this regime—limited accountability for the
protector’s failure to act; fiduciary liability for actions taken by the
protector—will skew the protector’s incentives towards inaction. From
an agency cost perspective, however, this system of skewed incentives
is a plus, not a minus. The tension between authority and accountability
is central to every agency relationship. A settlor’s objective in using a
trust protector is to make the trustee more accountable without
removing from the trustee the authority to act in areas where the trustee
has presumed expertise. A regime in which the protector generally
defers to the trustee’s decisions, intervening only in extraordinary
circumstances, has the potential to advance the settlor’s objectives
better than a regime in which the protector has incentives to intervene in
day-to-day management. Imposing fiduciary duties on the protector
114
115

See 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 185.
Cf. Warner v. First Nat’l Bank, 236 F.2d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 1956) (holding that managing
advisor to executors was not himself a trustee, but might be liable for giving fraudulent or
careless advice).
116 See 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 185 (4th ed. 2001).
117 See, e.g., Von Knierem v. Bermuda Trust Co., Ltd., [1995] S.C.B. 154.
118 See id.; see also Duckworth, supra note 12, at 251 (Example 1).
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when the protector exercises its power reduces threats to the trustee’s
authority. By contrast, imposing fiduciary duties on the trustee when
the protector fails to act would introduce increased protector
intervention, and a corresponding reduction of the trustee’s authority.
At the same time, the knowledge that the protector has power to
intervene, even if the protector has limited financial incentive to do so,
supplements the prospect of fiduciary duty liability as a mechanism for
holding the trustee accountable.
4.

Protector Self-Dealing

So far, the discussion has focused on providing incentives to
induce the protector to engage in appropriate monitoring of trustee
behavior. But what of the protector who uses his power to engage in
self-dealing. That is, suppose the protector “consents” to a trustee
decision to invest trust assets in an enterprise in which the protector has
an interest, or suppose the protector directs the trustee to make such an
investment. The approach to these issues should generally be obvious:
absent language or circumstances suggesting the contrary, there is little
reason to believe that the settlor was more willing to permit self-dealing
by the protector than by the trustee. Hence, the protector’s liability for
losses due to affirmative actions taken by the protector in which the
protector stands to benefit personally should be comparable to trustee
liability.
A somewhat more difficult question arises when the trustee
proposes a trust investment that stands to benefit the protector, and the
protector has power to veto that decision, but does not do so. One
might conclude that the trustee’s judgment about the propriety of the
investment should insulate the protector from liability. That is, if the
trustee, who has no personal interest, decides that the investment is a
prudent one, the primary risk of self-dealing—the inability of the selfdealer to separate his own interest from the trust’s interest—has been
eliminated. But that conclusion ignores an important fact: the trustee
will often have an incentive to curry favor with the protector, who may
have the power to veto the trustee’s decisions, or even to replace the
trustee.119 Hence, a trustee may not exercise dispassionate review of
investments that generate benefit for the trust protector. As a result, the
protector, like a trustee, should be required to veto such transactions, or
to obtain court approval. Of course, if the trust settlor reaches a

119 Cf. Johnson & Millon, supra note 89, at 1613-14 (discussing “cozy” relationship between
boards of directors and senior officers that may impede monitoring of behavior by officers).
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different conclusion, the settlor can draft the trust instrument
accordingly.
C.

Protector Powers Related to Trust Distribution Rather than
Trust Management

Consider now the protector whose powers do not extend to review
of the trustee’s administration of the trust. That is, suppose the
protector’s powers relate largely to adjustments in the time and method
of trust distribution. Thus, to deal with the settlor’s inability to foresee
future events, the settlor empowers the protector to modify the trust’s
terms, or to terminate the trust, or to change the trust situs to better
insulate trust assets from creditor claims. Alternatively, the settlor
empowers the protector to authorize distributions to particular trust
beneficiaries if, in the protector’s judgment, circumstances warrant.
Disputes are most likely to arise when action by the protector
would have differential effects on the various trust beneficiaries, aiding
some while harming others. Thus, a protector’s decision to modify a
generation-skipping trust to permit settlor’s impoverished child to reach
trust principal would be of clear benefit to the child, but not to the
settlor’s grandchildren.120 Similarly, a protector’s decision to move the
trust’s situs to a jurisdiction that has abolished the Rule Against
Perpetuities, and to modify the instrument to eliminate trust termination
provisions might assist settlor’s remote descendants at the expense of
living descendants who would prefer rapid distribution of trust
principal.
In situations like these, there is no readily available metric for
evaluating the protector’s action or inaction.121
The warring
beneficiaries may have disparate interests that are not amenable to easy
aggregation. Moreover, neither the protector nor a reviewing court will
possess strong evidence of the settlor’s wishes; the settlor will typically

120 Typically, a generation-skipping trust would be drafted to preclude the settlor’s child from
reaching the trust corpus. If the child had an unlimited power to invade principal, the child would
hold a general power of appointment over the trust property, and the property would be included
within the child’s taxable estate under 26 U.S.C. § 2041 (2000), thus defeating the settlor’s
original purpose.
121 A similar problem arises with respect to a trustee’s duty of impartiality, which is easy to
state but difficult to define. As the drafters of the Restatement have put it, “[i]t would be overly
simplistic, and therefore misleading, to equate impartiality with some concept of ‘equality’ of
treatment or concern—that is, to assume that the interests of all beneficiaries have the same
priority and are entitled to the same weight in the trustee’s balancing of those interests.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
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have appointed the protector precisely because the settlor could not
anticipate the circumstances that have, in fact, unfolded.122
Under these circumstances, close judicial scrutiny of the
protector’s actions is likely to involve increased monitoring cost without
a commensurate reduction in agency cost. If courts deem the protector
to have breached a duty of care or duty of impartiality whenever the
court concludes that a different decision would have better served the
aggregate interests of the trust beneficiaries, courts will encourage
disappointed beneficiaries to litigate every adverse protector
determination.123 Moreover, it is far from clear that the results reached
by courts in those litigations would, on average, be superior to those
reached by the protectors who made the initial decisions.124 After all,
the settlor reposed his confidence in the protector, not in the reviewing
court.
At the same time, abandoning all judicial scrutiny over the
protector’s decisions would leave protectors unduly free of ties to their
principals. Markets are unlikely to be effective in disciplining trust
protectors; even if a class of professional protectors were to emerge, it
would be difficult for settlors to identify which protectors had been
most effective in making distribution decisions.125 Moral obligation
would serve as the most significant constraint on protector behavior. In
general, law’s experience with other fiduciaries has been that moral
obligation, often an essential component in guiding fiduciary
behavior,126 is not by itself sufficient to generate optimal levels of care
and loyalty.127

122 Cf. id. (“[I]t is often the case that the implications of the duty of impartiality are
complicated by the difficulties of determining, and the vagueness of, some relevant aspects of the
settlor’s intentions and objectives . . . .”).
123 Cf. Rock & Wachter, supra note 23, at 667 (noting, in the corporate context, that imposing
close judicial scrutiny when judges cannot reliably distinguish between negligent and nonnegligent behavior “causes a host of problems”).
124 See id. at (noting as a justification of the business judgment rule that “courts with inferior
information will do systematically worse than the internal governance mechanism in adjudicating
the merits of a dispute”); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2005) (“When a trustee has discretion with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is
subject to supervision by a court only to prevent abuse of discretion.”).
125 Cf. Leslie, supra note 3, at 82-84 (detailing absence of market monitoring of trustee
performance).
126 See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1256-66 (1999) (exploring obligational norms, and conceptualizing fiduciary duties as a
form of obligational norms).
127 Indeed, the law of trusts developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when the
chancellor began to require the trustee—previously bound only by moral obligations—to act upon
the dictates of his conscience. See Richard H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1503 (1979).
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The natural compromise is to subject protectors to judicial review,
but to apply a deferential standard to the protector’s actions.128 Courts
already apply such a standard to trustees of discretionary trusts.129 A
protector with power to decide whether to make distributions of trust
income or principal occupies essentially the same position, and should
generally be subject to the same standard of review.
Sometimes, however, the protector’s powers have no ready
analogues in the realm of discretionary trusts. The trustee of a
discretionary trust, for instance, rarely has power to terminate or modify
the trust, or to change its situs. Nevertheless, the basic principle that
remains is a similar one: a protector fulfills his legal duty to the
beneficiaries when the protector identifies at least one trust purpose that
would be advanced by the protector’s decision to exercise, or not to
exercise, a non-management power conferred on him by the trust
instrument, and when the protector’s decision was reasonably calculated
to advance that purpose.130 Whether the protector should have
advanced some other trust purpose, or chosen another course of action
128 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (abuse of
discretion standard applied to discretionary powers held by trustees).
129 When the trust instrument confers on the trustee broad discretion and does not constrain
that discretion by reference to an external standard—such as support or maintenance of a
particular beneficiary—courts typically sustain the trustee’s exercise of discretion so long as the
trustee has a legitimate motive and no personal stake in the decision. See, e.g., In re Trusts A &
B, 672 N.W.2d 912, 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Bushong v. Castle, No. 98AP-29, 1998 WL
767453 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1998) (sustaining trustee’s payment to life beneficiary with
prepaid checks, even when trustee made no investigation of need, because there was no evidence
of bad faith by the trustee); Strong v. Dann, 108 A. 86, 87 (N.J. Ch. 1919) (“[T]he court has no
power to command or prohibit the exercise of the discretion confided to the trustee if his conduct
be bona fide, and there is neither proof nor suggestion of mala fides in this case.”).
If the trustee of a discretionary trust refuses to consider a distribution decision suggested by
a beneficiary, the trustee’s failure to exercise judgment may be an abuse, but even in that case, the
court will not compel the trustee to make any payment; instead, the court may simply direct the
trustee to exercise the judgment conferred on the trustee by the trust instrument. See, e.g., Finch
v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 577 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to compel
payment when trustee abused discretion by refusing to consider making payments to charity
favored by trust beneficiary, and concluding that decision whether or not to make payment was
within trustee’s discretion).
When the trust instrument constrains the trustee’s discretion by referring to an external
standard, such as “reasonable maintenance, comfort and support” or procurement of “necessary
and reasonable medical care,” courts are more likely to find an abuse of discretion when the
trustee does not appear guided by that standard, even if the trust instrument purports to confer on
the trustee “sole and uncontrolled discretion.” See Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1991); First Nat’l Bank v. Howard, 229 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1950); see also Schofield v.
Commerce Trust Co., 319 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (finding it was an abuse of discretion
not to make payments for son’s medical care when instrument authorized trustee to make
payments “if necessary for upkeep of my son”).
130 A similar standard applies to a trustee’s exercise of broad discretionary powers in a
discretionary trust. So long as the trustee’s action is founded on a legitimate motive, and the
trustee’s action is not tainted by self-interest, courts will not upset the trustee’s exercise of
discretion. See, e.g., In re Trusts A & B, 672 N.W.2d at 919.
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that would have better advanced the protector’s chosen purpose, should
be beyond the scope of judicial review. What the settlor expects from
the protector is a reasonable exercise of judgment;131 if doctrine expects
much more, protectors may become difficult to find.132
D.

Remedies for Breach by the Protector

Suppose imposing fiduciary duties on trust protectors is necessary
to minimize agency costs. What recourse do the trustee or the
beneficiaries have for breach of those duties? First, and most obviously,
the beneficiaries have a claim against the protector for losses suffered
as a result of the protector’s breach.133 Without a personal claim against
the protector, the protector has little financial incentive to avoid selfdealing or other misconduct, and litigation would serve as an ineffective
tool for monitoring the protector’s behavior. But damage actions
against the protector do not exhaust the potential remedies available to
the trustee and the beneficiaries.
Consider the case in which the trustee and the protector are at odds.
Either the trustee needs the protector’s consent to take action and the
protector will not give consent, or the protector has given the trustee
directions that the trustee does not want to follow. In those situations,
the trustee should be free to seek judicial direction, much as a trustee
could seek judicial construction of the trust instrument or judicial
approval of a transaction in which the trustee has a personal interest.134
The trustees are not directly seeking to compel action by the protector,
but rather to obtain judicial approval for their own actions, which would

131 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“When
the exercise of a discretionary power is left to the judgment of a trustee, an abuse of discretion
may result from the trustee’s improper failure to exercise that judgment.”).
132 Cf. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 104, at 455 (noting, in the corporate context, that
liability for negligence could be highly disproportionate to the incentives for serving as a director,
making it difficult to attract qualified candidates as outside directors).
133 Antony Duckworth has raised a doctrinal question about judicial enforcement of protector
obligations. He suggests that enforcement requires a recognized basis, such as contract or trust,
and he finds difficulty with each in the context of protectors. The protector may not have
formally entered into a contract accepting the position, and the protector, unlike a trustee, does
not hold any legal interest in the trust property. Duckworth concedes, however, that one way or
another, courts will find a basis for liability against protectors who breach fiduciary duties.
Duckworth, supra note 12, at 254-55.
134 In a case arising in the Isle of Man, a court held that a trust should not fail for want of a
protector, and when no successor protector could be appointed, a court could exercise the powers
conferred on the trust protector. Steele v. Paz Ltd., discussed in Waters, supra note 22, at 114-15.
Presumably, the same principle would apply when the protector refuses to take action required by
the trust instrument as when the office of the protector becomes vacant.
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not otherwise be authorized under the terms of the trust instrument.135
The situation is not materially different from one in which co-trustees
disagree, and either has standing to seek judicial directions to avoid
liability for breach resulting from the other’s preferred course of
action.136
When the protector’s behavior displeases the beneficiaries, but not
the trustee, the beneficiaries have three alternatives: they can seek to
compel the protector to take particular action, they can seek removal of
the protector, or they can seek damages for the protector’s breach of
fiduciary duty. A beneficiary who seeks to compel the protector to act
faces an uphill battle. If the beneficiary wants the protector to intervene
in a matter of trust administration, the problem is that the trust
instrument typically—and sensibly—contemplates that the protector
will defer to the trustee’s judgment on such matters, except in unusual
circumstances. If the protector chooses to defer to the trustee on an
administrative matter, the beneficiaries should not be entitled to compel
the protector to oppose the trustee unless the trustee’s action would
itself be a clear breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty. If the instrument
gives the protector power to direct distributions from the trust, a
beneficiary is on firmer ground in seeking to compel the protector to
act, but a court would nevertheless apply an “abuse of discretion”
standard comparable to that applicable to the trustee of a discretionary
trust. The same standard ought to apply if a beneficiary were seeking to
prevent the protector from authorizing distributions.
Consider next the trust protector who has already engaged in
misconduct. The protector should be as subject to removal as other
fiduciaries who have misconducted themselves, on a similar rationale:
past is prologue.137 With trustees or executors, however, judicial
removal is typically accompanied by appointment of a substitute
fiduciary.138 From an agency cost perspective, however, it is less clear
135 Cf. Duckworth, supra note 12, at 255 (discussing Canadian and English cases in which the
court itself gave directions to the trustee when the person with power to give the trustee
investment directions became disabled, because of a conflict of interest, from giving those
directions).
136 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 cmt. c. (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“If a
situation arises in which prudence requires that the trustees reach a decision and they are
unwilling or unable to do so, the trustees have a duty to apply to an appropriate court for
instructions.”).
137 See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 370 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977) (refusing
appointment of trustee because her use of trust assets for herself under a previous will
undermined confidence in her ability to fairly administer the trust); Brault v. Bigham, 493 S.W.2d
576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (holding that an attempted appropriation of trust funds was an
indication of future danger to the trust).
138 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-223 (2004); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-2.6
(McKinney 2005) (authorizing appointment of successor trustee upon removal of trustee). See
generally 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 108.2.
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that removal of one protector should be followed by appointment of
another.
The protector, unlike a trustee, is not essential for
administration of the trust. Moreover, as we have seen, appointment of
the protector introduces agency costs that may or may not outweigh the
benefits the protector generates in better monitoring of trustee behavior.
Hence, appointment of a substitute protector should not be automatic.
Instead, much should depend on the terms of the trust instrument.
Suppose, for instance, that the settlor of the trust appointed a protector
with whom the settlor had a close personal relationship, and included no
provision for a substitute protector. There is little reason to think such a
settlor would want a court to appoint a substitute upon forfeiture of the
office by the settlor’s chosen protector. Conversely, if the trust
instrument makes provision for successors, or makes it impossible for
the trustee to perform its function without a protector (for instance, if
the trust instrument provides that the trustee may not make new
investments without the protector’s consent), then a court should
appoint a substitute protector in deference to the settlor’s expressed
intentions.
E.

Effect of the Protector’s Action and Inaction on Trustee Liability

In a world without trust protectors, potential liability for breach of
fiduciary duty has served as a principal mechanism for deterring
misbehavior by trustees. Once a settlor introduces a trust protector into
the picture, should the protector’s presence affect the potential liability
of the trustee? That is, to what extent should protector monitoring serve
as a substitute for, rather than merely a supplement to, trustee liability
for breach of fiduciary duty?
The trustee’s argument in these cases would be that the protector,
by action or inaction, implicitly authorized the trustee’s behavior, and
that the protector’s authorization immunized the trustee from liability
for breach of fiduciary duty.
1.

Powers Not Held by the Protector in a Fiduciary Capacity

As we have seen, the trust instrument might explicitly provide that
a trust protector owes no fiduciary duties to trust beneficiaries, or
context might make it clear that the protector can act out of personal
self-interest. In those circumstances, if the protector acts within the
power granted by the trust instrument, and directs the trustee to make
particular investments, or withholds consent from decisions the trustee
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believes prudent, the trustee who follows the protector’s directions, or
who abstains from taking actions to which the protector refuses to
consent, should not be liable to the beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary
duty. In these limited circumstances, the clear intent of the settlor to
insulate the trustee from liability should prevail; when the trust
instrument implicitly or explicitly authorizes the protector to act in selfinterest, the trustee has no power to veto decisions made by the
protector even if those decisions are not in the interest of the other trust
beneficiaries.139
We now turn to the more common situation in which the protector
does owe duties to the trust beneficiaries.
2.

Inaction by the Protector

In a regime where protector deference to the trustee’s decisions
should be the norm, the trustee should not be in a position to seek
shelter from the protector’s inaction. The protector’s failure to
intervene in administration of the trust need not signal approval of the
trustee’s action, but might instead represent a reluctance to interfere
with the trustee’s exercise of discretion conferred by the settlor.
Moreover, in those cases where the trust instrument prevents the
trustee from acting without the consent or direction of the protector, and
the protector withholds that consent or direction, the trustee may not use
the protector’s inaction as a shield for the trustee’s own inaction when
the trustee knew or should have known that the protector’s inaction
could harm the trust or breach a duty owed by the protector.140 In that
situation, the trustee’s obligation is to seek judicial directions.141
3.

Protector Ratification of the Trustee’s Action

Similarly, when the trust instrument requires that the protector
consent to particular actions proposed by the trustee, the protector’s
139 A number of cases involving a beneficiary or settlor with power to direct or consent to trust
investments have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Ditmars v. Camden Trust Co., 76 A.2d
280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950) (holding that the trustee was insulated from liability by life
tenant’s refusal to consent when the instrument gave the life tenant power of approval for sale of
securities); Reeve v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 287 N.Y.S. 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936) (holding that the
settlor’s direction to purchase bonds insulated the trustee from liability when settlor reserved
complete control over trust investments); In re Jacobs’ Trust Estate, 183 A. 49 (Pa. 1936) (same).
140 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“Where
the terms of the trust do not allow the trustee to act without the consent of another, the trustee is
not necessarily justified in doing nothing merely because the consent has not been received.”).
141 Id.
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ratification should not generally insulate the trustee from liability for
breach of fiduciary duty. Insulating the trustee from liability permits
the trustee to shift responsibility for decisions to the protector, and
reduces the incentive for the trustee to exercise care: if the protector
ratifies the trustee’s action, the trustee would escape liability; if the
protector does not ratify, the trustee cannot take the action, and
therefore cannot incur liability. Moreover, even if the protector has the
power to remove the trustee, that removal power would provide an
incentive for the trustee to do the protector’s bidding, not to act as an
independent safeguard of the interests of the trust beneficiaries.
The position of the trustee whose action receives approval from the
trust protector resembles the position of a trustee whose action is
endorsed by a co-trustee. Endorsement or approval by the co-trustee
does not relieve the trustee who proposes an action from liability for
breach of fiduciary duty.142 The rationale for that rule applies with
equal force to the trustee who needs and obtains consent from a
protector: when the settlor reposed power in multiple fiduciaries, the
settlor expected each independently to act with prudence and loyalty
toward the trust beneficiaries.143
The situation is different when the settlor has named a trust
protector with the express purpose of insulating the trustee from liability
from particular claims of breach of fiduciary duty—particularly claims
of self-dealing by the trustee. The no-further-inquiry rule typically
requires a trustee to seek court approval for any transaction between the
trustee and the trust, however advantageous that transaction might be
for the trust.144 A settlor might name a trust protector, with power to
142 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81(2) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (providing
that each trustee “has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a
breach of trust . . . .”); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703(e) (2005) (“A trustee may not delegate
to a cotrustee the performance of a function the settlor reasonably expected the trustees to
perform jointly.”); 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 184 (4th ed. 2001).
143 See generally UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703 cmt. (“Cotrustees are appointed for a variety of
reasons.”). Having multiple decision-makers serves as a safeguard against eccentricity or
misconduct. By contrast, when a trustee receives approval for a proposed action from all of the
trust’s beneficiaries, as opposed to a co-trustee or trust protector, that approval does generally
insulate the trustee from liability for the action, so long as the trustee has provided the
beneficiaries with complete information. See, e.g., Meier v. Union Trust Co. of Indianapolis, 176
N.E. 42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1931); Mann v. Day, 165 N.W. 643 (Mich. 1917); Turner v. Fryberger,
109 N.W. 229 (Minn. 1906). In that situation, however, there is no potential for explicit or
implicit collusion between the parties to limit the rights of trust beneficiaries; the beneficiaries
themselves have consented to the arrangement. Moreover, estoppel principles would generally
preclude beneficiaries from challenging actions they themselves have approved.
144 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005)
(“[U]nder the so-called ‘no further inquiry’ principle it is immaterial that the trustee may be able
to show that the action in question was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were
fair, and that no profit resulted to the trustee.”). For discussion of the continued vitality of the no
further inquiry rule, compare Langbein, supra note 5, with Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the
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approve self-dealing by the trustee, precisely to avoid the costs
associated with judicial approval. In that situation, protector’s approval
should insulate the trustee from liability.
4.

Protector Directs Action by the Trustee

The most difficult problems arise when the trustee follows
directions given by the trust protector. Ordinarily, when the trust
instrument confers on the protector authority to direct the trustee to
make particular investments or distributions, the trustee is obligated to
follow directions issued by the protector in the exercise of that
authority.145 Sometimes, however, the protector’s directions may
breach the protector’s fiduciary duty, even if the directions are not
inconsistent with the express language of the trust instrument.146
As a practical matter, the trustee faced with directions of
questionable validity has several choices. The trustee can follow the
protector’s directions.147 The trustee can seek judicial approval of a
decision to follow the protector’s directions.148 The trustee can seek
approval from the trust beneficiaries. If the trustee obtains judicial
approval or approval from the trust beneficiaries, the trustee has
effectively insulated itself from liability for breach of fiduciary duty.
But what if, instead, the trustee follows the protector’s directions?
If the trust beneficiaries were optimal monitors of the actions of
trust protectors, there would be little reason to hold the trustee liable for
following the protector’s directions, even when those directions
breached the protector’s fiduciary duty. Because the beneficiaries can
hold the protector accountable through an action for breach of fiduciary
duty, the protector would have ex ante incentives to act appropriately,

No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541
(2005).
145 As the Restatement points out:
Where the terms of the trust provide that, in administering the trust, the trustee shall
take certain actions if so directed by another person, it is ordinarily the trustee’s duty to
comply with that person’s direction; the trustee would ordinarily be liable for a loss
resulting from failure to do so.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
146 See generally Bove, supra note 27, at 390, 392.
147 The trustee can first question the protector, which might, in some circumstances, cause the
protector to reconsider. If, however, the protector does not reconsider, the trustee is left with the
same alternatives.
148 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (stating that
if the power holder insists upon compliance with the power holder’s directions despite the
trustee’s objection, the trustee may apply to the court for instructions); cf. In re Rogers, 63 O.L.R.
180 (1929) (discussed in Waters, supra note 22, at 75).
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while the beneficiaries would receive compensation ex post when the
protector does not act appropriately.
But a primary reason for introducing protectors into the world of
domestic trusts is that beneficiaries are often inadequate monitors of
their own interests. The trustee, on the other hand, has typically been
appointed to protect the interests of the trust beneficiaries. Holding the
trustee liable for failing to seek judicial or beneficiary consent before
acceding to the protector’s questionable directions provides the trustee
with an incentive to monitor the protector’s actions.149 In most cases,
this incentive will result in discussions between the protector and the
trustee, resulting in a resolution that incorporates the judgments of both
protector and trustee.150
The difficult problem is determining when the cost to the trustee of
monitoring the protector’s behavior exceeds the value of that
monitoring.151 In general, the cost to the trustee of monitoring the
prudence of the protector’s investment directions is likely to be low. As
a result, if a protector directs the trustee to follow investment practices
not explicitly authorized by settlor and seriously at odds with modern
portfolio theory, the trustee should not be entitled to follow the
protector’s directions without risk of liability.152 By contrast, the cost to
the trustee of determining whether protector has engaged in self-dealing
is likely to be higher.153 The trustee has little reason to know enough
about the protector’s personal financial affairs to determine whether the
protector’s decisions generate personal benefit for the protector.154
149 For authorities suggesting that the trustee should be liable in this instance, see In re Cross,
175 A. 212, 214 (N.J. Eq. 1934), rev’d on other grounds, 176 A. 101 (N.J. 1935); Note, Trust
Advisors, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1230, 1233 (1965); SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 574-75;
Waters, supra note 22, at 85-86.
150 Alternatively, if the protector persists in directing an action that the trustee believes
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, the trustee would be forced to seek judicial instructions.
See generally Trust Advisors, supra note 149, at 1233.
151 The Restatement of Trusts attempts to capture this problem by providing that if the holder
of a power to direct the trustee violates a fiduciary duty in exercising the power, “the trustee is not
liable for acting in accordance with the exercise of the power unless the trustee knows or should
have known that the power holder acted in violation of the fiduciary duty.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. e (Tentative Draft, No. 4, 2005).
152 For a case holding a professional co-executor subject to liability for losses that resulted
when co-executor, testator’s brother, refused to consent to a sale of stock, and the will required
brother’s consent to any sale, see In re Cross, 172 A. 212 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1934), rev’d on other
grounds, 176 A. 101 (N.J. 1935). The court wrote that the testator’s direction that stock not be
sold without the brother’s consent “ceased to be a shield when the estate became endangered by
his conduct.” Id. at 215. The decision was reversed on the ground that the brother’s actions were
not negligent.
153 In many instances, the protector may be the only source of information about his own selfdealing, he may be unlikely to disclose that self-dealing. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 453.
154 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005):
[W]here the terms of the trust provide that the trustee shall make such investments as a
designated person may direct, and the person directs a trustee to purchase certain
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Moreover, generating that information about a transaction that, on its
face, appears to be in the interests of the trust beneficiaries would
typically cost more than the information is worth to those beneficiaries.
Hence, the trustee should not typically bear liability for failing to detect
self-dealing by a protector in a transaction that appeared to be fair and
prudent for the beneficiaries.155
F.

The Effect of the Trust Instrument: Default or Mandatory Rules?

The preceding sections have demonstrated that the typical settlor
concerned about agency costs should want to impose fiduciary duties on
trust protectors, and should not want to exculpate them from liability.
The remaining question is whether the liability regime sketched out in
previous sections should be treated as a default regime or as one with
mandatory elements.
For a variety of reasons, the case for mandatory rules is a weak
one.156 First, the variation in reasons for appointing protectors, and
hence, the capacities and weaknesses of protectors appointed, vary too
significantly to impose on trust settlors a one-size-fits-all regime for
governance of trust protectors. Second, the newness of the protector
concept suggests that experimentation rather than fiat is more likely to
lead to efficient regulatory structures. Third, at this juncture, protectors
as a class have little market power and no stranglehold on information,
making it unlikely that they could dupe settlors or their lawyers into
including protector provisions unfavorable to the trust beneficiaries.
Hence, one would expect courts to demonstrate considerable respect for
alternative governance schemes developed by settlors and their
lawyers—especially when those schemes are narrowly tailored to
address identified potential conflicts.
Nevertheless, some cautions are in order. First, it will be difficult
for settlors and their lawyers to determine in advance the sorts of
imprudent or self-interested behavior in which protectors might engage.
Broad exculpatory clauses might reflect imperfections of foresight

securities, the trustee is not liable for doing so merely because it is later shown that the
designated person had a personal interest in having the trust purchase the securities,
provided the trustee neither knew nor had reason to believe that (and thus a duty to
investigate whether) this conflict of interests existed.
Id.

155 Cf. Duckworth, supra note 12, at 254 (trustee should be excused if trustee acted “honestly
and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused”).
156 But see Duckworth, supra note 12, at 176 (discussing limits on powers the protector might
have).
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rather than clarity of purpose.157 Trust settlors will rarely intend to give
protectors the equivalent of fee ownership of the trust assets (at least
when the protector is not a very close relative).158 But the combination
of broad powers together with a broad exculpatory clause can give the
protector very close to absolute rights in the trust property. Hence, for
the same reasons courts have been unwilling to construe trust
instruments to exculpate trustees from all breaches of fiduciary duty,
courts should properly be skeptical of overbroad provisions purporting
to exculpate trust protectors—particularly when the protector’s conduct
has been egregious.159
CONCLUSION
The relationship between the trust’s settlor and a trust protector is
founded primarily on trust; the settlor trusts the protector to act as a
faithful agent. In this respect, the relationship resembles that between
fourteenth century landowners and their feoffees—precursors to the
modern trustee who agreed to do the bidding of their principals by
holding, and transferring, legal title in accordance with instructions
given to them by those principals.160 Initially, the feoffee’s obligations
were entirely moral; his duties were not enforceable at all.161 But the
history of the early trust suggests that the relationship between the
protector and the settlor, like the relationship between landowner and
feoffee, will not long escape the scrutiny of the legal system; trust alone
has proven inadequate to ensure that trustees act as faithful agents.162
Fiduciary duties have emerged to play a significant, albeit
supplementary, role.
Fiduciary duties are likely to play a similar role in disciplining trust
protectors. But protectors are not simply trustees by another name. The
settlor who names a protector chooses to forego more traditional
arrangements for shared responsibility for trust decisions, presumably
out of a belief that the protector model adds value that traditional
arrangements cannot capture. That added value is most likely to come
in two forms: reduced agency costs in monitoring trustee behavior, and
increased ability to adapt the trust to changed circumstances. But the
agency costs associated with policing the protector threaten to dissipate
157
158
159
160
161
162

See Leslie, supra note 3, at 103.
See Duckworth, supra note 12, at 178.
Cf. Waters, supra note 22, at 85, 98-100.
See generally 1 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 1.3.
Id.
Id. § 1.4.
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this added value. If the protector is to survive as a trust institution, it
will do so because the fiduciary duty regime that surrounds protectors
minimizes those agency costs while maintaining the advantages
associated with protectors.
At this point in the development of the trust protector, any attempt
to describe a fiduciary duty regime that minimizes agency costs is
necessarily tentative and incomplete. My objective here has been to
provide a framework for developing that regime.

